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PORTUGAL'S REVOLUTION

by Gil Green

By the Same Author

Revolution Cuban Style (1970)
The New Radicalism (1971)
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PORTUGAL'S REVOLUTION

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1. April 25

Grándola, sunburned
Town of brothers
Where the people take first place.
A friend on every corner.
Equality on every face.

THE words of this revolutionary song heard over Radio Lisbon in the early hours of April 25, 1974 were the signal that the military uprising had begun. Swiftly, quietly, army officers committed to the cause mustered their troops and took command of every key government, military and communication center in the country.

The timing and coordination were perfect; the military force, overwhelming; the resistance, just about nonexistent. Forty-eight years of brutal fascist dictatorship were ended by a bloodless coup. Springtime had come to Portugal.

Some hours later, still before dawn, the revolutionary junta broadcast its first proclamation:

> Considering that after 13 years of fighting overseas the present political system has been unable to define an overseas policy leading to peace . . .
>
> Considering the need to clean up institutions and to eliminate abuses of power . . .
>
> Considering the duty of the military to the nation . . .
>
> The Movement of the Armed Forces . . . proclaims to the

nation its intention to complete a program of national salvation and to restore to the Portuguese people the civil liberties of which they have been deprived.

The wording of this Proclamation is remarkable for its matter-of-fact, dispassionate tone and the deliberate understatement of grievances against the regime. There is no attempt to arouse and inflame the public. There is no indictment of the five decades of brutal repression, of murders, tortures, lengthy imprisonments and terrible oppression. The word "fascism" does not appear. The "present political system" is mildly criticized for failing to find an "overseas policy leading to peace." There is reference to "abuses of power," the intention to carry through a program of national salvation, and a promise to restore civil liberties. Nothing more. The people are not called upon to rise and help wipe clean the slate of fascism. In fact, separate announcements of the military authorities urged people to remain calm, keep stores and businesses closed, remain at home, and await further notice.

This subdued, non-inflammatory tone reflected the situation in the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) at the time. It represented a compromise between two tendencies—that which saw the need for a vast revolutionary upheaval and the overthrow of the Marcello Caetano regime as a precondition for this, and that which saw the overthrow as both a beginning and an end. This latter tendency did not want things to "go too far," and it was reflected by a like consideration on the part of the governmental forces being ousted. This is to be seen in the way in which Caetano surrendered power.

Caetano had taken refuge in the barracks of the Republican Guard, a paramilitary unit responsible for internal security. The *New York Times* of April 26 describes what took place:

Premier Caetano, using two officials of the Ministry of Information as intermediaries, sought to hand over power to General Spinola "so that the Government would not fall in the street."

The General answered, also through the intermediaries, that he required a mandate from the officers who had begun the rebellion. He is said to have declared: "I am not the leader of this movement. I did not act against the Government. If it has the good sense to find a solution, I think I will be doing a service by speaking to the rebels."

He then undertook negotiations with the rebels, who agreed to give him a mandate to meet with the Premier . . . The meeting was said to be polite, the witnesses reported that Premier Caetano was calm and even jocular. Mr. Caetano agreed to surrender.

In this way the fascist dictator was permitted to choose to whom to hand over power "so that the Government would not fall in the street." And the man he chose for this honor was neither the leader of the rebel movement nor even one of those who acted against the government. If the story is true that Caetano was calm and even jocular, there was reason for this. He had been given assurances of personal safety for himself and his colleagues. After all, this was but a misunderstanding between gentlemen that could be settled in an orderly and civilized manner.

In choosing General Spinola, Premier Caetano knew his man. General Antonio de Spinola was a career soldier. He had been the military governor in Guinea-Bissau and, as later became public knowledge, was deeply implicated in the assassination of Amilcar Cabral, the great leader of the national liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. He also was a member of the Board of Directors of a steel company controlled by the Champalimaud conglomerate. More recently, he had been Deputy to the Chief of the Joint Defense Staff, General Francisco da Costa Gomes.

Seven weeks before the military takeover, Spínola had publicly collided with Caetano over colonial policy. This began with the appearance of a book written by Spínola, *Portugal and the Future*. This declared that the war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau could not be won by military means. Spínola condemned what he called a "sterile" debate between those who thought the war had to be continued as a matter of national honor and unity, and those who argued that the "winds of history" make independence inevitable.

He rejected these as "dogmatic" extremes. He saw three possible courses: a policy of concessions, which he considered "a limited path"; the path of even harsher repression, which, he believed, would only escalate the violence; and a policy of "liberalization," which he thought would work. He conceded that liberalization had its dangers, but would work "if developed progressively, under firm authority." This meant the need "to protect the position of the European settlers, who have property there and who built their lives and their dreams there." He projected the vision of an integrated Portuguese Commonwealth with Africans having some share in national life at the top and a larger degree of autonomy on regional levels.

In other words, Spínola wanted Portugal to give up the shadow of colonial empire in order to better hold on to its substance. He believed that by a conscious policy of bribing a stratum of African Black intellectuals and propertied groupings with the promise of a share in government, it would be possible to end the guerrilla war and keep imperialist economic holdings intact.

The appearance of Spínola's book caused a furor. This was further aggravated when it became known that the book had been seen and approved by Gen. Costa Gomes, the Defense Chief of Staff. He had sent out a confidential memorandum praising the book as offering a middle way out of the dilemma.

On March 15, three weeks after the book's appearance, Premier Caetano acted to stem the raging debate over colonial policy and the growing mood of rebellion in the armed forces. He summarily dismissed Gen. Costa Gomes and Spinola from all military posts for insubordination. Gen. Joaquim da Luz Cunha, commander in Angola and former Defense Minister, was chosen as Chief of Staff. General da Luz Cunha was known as a get-tough extreme rightwinger. It was clear that his responsibility was to purge the army of all insubordination.

Spinola's book, and the intemperate response of the regime to it, were important contributing winds, therefore, to the storm which finally broke in the pre-dawn hours of April 25. This explains how Spinola, who, in his own words, "did not act against the Government," became an important factor in the events that occurred. It also explains Caetano's choice of Spinola as the man to hand over a governmental power which, in reality, he had already lost, and why this was acceptable to the Armed Forces Movement.

Spinola's book and his subsequent purge by Caetano had made of him something of a popular hero. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Revolutionary Council of the MFA named him as the Provisional President of the Republic.

2. As Two Saw It

"HOW did you personally experience the events of April 25?", I asked two Portuguese friends. We had just finished lunch and were waiting for coffee that would not come. We had not yet learned that in Portugal coffee and food are strangers that rarely meet at the same table. To eat, one goes to a restaurant; for coffee, to a coffee shop.

Domingo Lopes is 25 years old, with pitch black hair falling almost to his shoulders, a mustache that droops at the ends, dark eyes, a handsome intelligent face, and a quick and ready smile. He speaks English.

Domingo had been a student in his last year of law school at the University of Lisbon. He was also a leader of the student movement and a member of the Portuguese Communist Party. He had joined in 1970.

On the night of April 24, Domingo had attended a small, clandestine meeting of select student leaders. The meeting lasted until about midnight. He was tired and went to sleep as soon as he got home. He was awakened by a knocking at the street door at about 4:00 A.M.

Who could it be? He was expecting no one. The dreaded security police? If so, how much did they know? Was it only a fishing expedition? An attempt at harassment? Was there anything in his possession that would implicate someone else?

As these thoughts raced through his mind he noticed something unusual about the persistent knocking. It had a nervous quality that seemed to say, "Hurry, hurry, I have something to tell you." He also knew that the police usually tried not to rouse the neighborhood, pre-

ferring the cover of darkness and no audience for their raids. He edged over to the window and peeped out. To his immense relief he recognized a comrade, one with whom he had met only a few hours ago.

His comrade told him that unable to sleep he had turned on his radio and heard an announcement that an Armed Forces Movement had overthrown the Caetano dictatorship. Domingo rushed to his own radio and heard the news confirmed.

The first reaction was one of skepticism. Could it be true? If so, what did it mean? Was it a coup within the dictatorship to try and rehabilitate it in the eyes of people? But it could be for real. They had known of a movement within the armed forces. They knew of the mass opposition to the war among the soldiers and officers. They also knew that Communists who were drafted for the service did not dodge it, but went into the army to consciously work against the war and the dictatorship. And they also recalled Party reports and resolutions which stressed that a successful democratic revolution could not be carried through by armed forces alone, but only together with the people.

But what about the people? Should they follow orders and just remain at home? What should they do? As they were discussing this they heard another knock at the door. It was a young woman from the local Party committee. She told them that the Party knew that the overthrow was for real. But it should not remain just an act of the army. The people must be urged to go into the streets and make the revolution their own. It was necessary to show solidarity with the armed forces and at the same time to arouse the people to make the revolution a truly peoples' democratic one, so that fascism could be destroyed root and branch.

Domingo then began to spread the good word and to urge people to go into the streets to demonstrate their anti-fascist unity with the armed forces movement. By the time he himself went to the main square, hundreds

of people carrying flags and banners were already there.

Francisco Aleixo, our other Portuguese friend, had a similar, although less dramatic, experience. Alex—as we called him—lives in Ovar, a small town of 20,000 people about 20 miles south of Oporto. He is a worker in his late sixties, solidly built, with muscular arms and shoulders, large caloused hands, and a quiet, genial and modest disposition. As a young sailor of 16, Alex had left Portugal and moved to the United States. He lived in Brooklyn and worked on the docks and in factories. He visited his family and home town periodically and on one such visit returned to the States with a wife. Upon retirement they decided to go back to Ovar for good. That was in 1972.

When Alex and his wife Margarita moved back, they tried to make contact with the underground movement. Alex knew that his relatives were anti-fascists, but none of them would talk about affiliations. They weren't taking chances with someone who had been away from Portugal for so many years—especially one coming from the United States and its hated CIA. But when Alex went into the streets on April 25, he saw a cousin of his carrying the Portuguese Communist Party flag. He then learned that this cousin was a leader of the local Party organization. Alex proudly told us that the Party in Ovar now had some 1200 members; nearly all young, and that he was the "old man."

Recognizing that friends in the United States were eager to learn what was happening in the new Portugal, Alex thoughtfully began mailing a regular packet of Portuguese newspapers to friends in New York. Through a knowledge of Spanish it did not take me long to learn how to decipher the Portuguese printed word well enough to follow events. I had written Alex about our planned trip and invited him and his wife to join us in Lisbon. He arrived at our hotel the same morning we did, but Margarita couldn't make it because she had injured an ankle. Alex remained with us for two days.

It was from him that we got our first direct insight into what was happening, particularly in his region of the country. We had left the United States at a time when the newspapers were filled with stories about mobs burning down Communist Party headquarters. Some of our friends thought we were mad to make a trip to Portugal at such a time. It seemed hazardous, as if fascism was about to take over or civil war to break out.

Alex's talk to us about the situation as he saw it, on our very first evening in Lisbon, was reassuring and at the same time—at least to our ears—a bit overly optimistic. He said, yes, the revolution has suffered some setbacks, but that is to be expected. It happens in all revolutions. But the setbacks are temporary, while the factors propelling the revolution forward are permanent.

Before our trip was over we understood better what generated his great feeling of confidence.

3. Which Way?

THE overthrow of the fascist dictatorship was joyously received by the people. It was the flower revolution. Overnight the atmosphere had changed. Everyone's politics seemed to take on a red hue. It was as if no one had ever supported the fascist regime, or been its hangmen, jailors, police, politicians, paid lackeys, or plain followers. Everyone was now a revolutionist, or claimed to be. But underneath the euphoria and the chameleon-like change in the coloration of many, fundamental class and social differences continued to exist. In general form they revolved around the questions: What path should the country take? What was the real road to basic revolutionary change?

The differences over colonial policy were immediate and obvious. Everyone now talked in the name of the revolution, all seemed to favor freedom for the colonies. But what some called freedom was far less than that for the enslaved.

Spínola, the new President, wanted an end to the overseas war. But he wanted it short of agreeing to independence. He wanted a form of neocolonialism that would protect the vast economic interests of western capitalism and would postpone independence to the indefinite future. And he used the powers of his high office to push this point of view. But to most workers, peasants and middle-class people whose sons were being drafted year after year to fight and die in a war that was not theirs, and especially to the soldiers doing the fighting and dying, the answer was not some vague promise of

self-determination, but immediate and unconditional independence.

This, of course, was the demand of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and the other colonies. Knowing that their heroic liberation struggle had played a major part in inducing the crisis which finally brought an end to the fascist regime, they were not disposed to accept anything less than their full and unconditional independence. "We are not fighting just to become black Portuguese," declared the Mozambique Liberation Front. "We are fighting to affirm ourselves as Mozambiquans without showing any disrespect for the Portuguese people or any other peoples." This was the firm, clear and dignified stand of the other colonial peoples as well.

Colonial policy was not the only issue of dispute. People wanted—desperately needed—a better life. Fascism, it should be remembered, is not just a certain style of government suited to the need of personal dictators. It is a form of rule imposed by the big-moneyed interests when democratic liberties impede their ability to super-exploit the common people. They then opt for a type of government that will crush popular resistence by brute force. Such is fascism, and such was the heavy yoke borne by the Portuguese people for nearly five decades.

PORTUGAL is a small country, about the size of the state of Indiana. It lies at the southwest extreme of the Iberian Peninsula, with Spain bordering it on the North and East, and the turbulent waters of the Atlantic washing its western and southern shores. With over 500 miles of seacoast, the ocean has been Portugal's great thoroughfare to the rest of the world.

Portuguese navigators and explorers led the way as early as the 14th century. Bartholomew Diaz was the first to round the Cape of Good Hope, opening up a sea route to India. Vasco da Gama, was the first navigator to

reach India by sea. Pedro Alvares Cabral, landed in Brazil and claimed it for the crown. Ferdinand Magellan crossed from the Atlantic to the Pacific by way of the strait named after him, and one of his vessels completed the first voyage around the globe, proving that the earth was round.

Portugal was a colonial power for over 500 years. Even as late as the time of the Caetano overthrow, its overseas territories were 23 times larger in area than Portugal itself. Mozambique, with its rich oil, coal and agricultural products, is the size of Texas. Angola, with its oil, diamonds, iron ore, copper, manganese, gold, coal, sulpher and coffee, is twice the size of Texas and 14 times the size of Portugal.

The overseas empire was not all a blessing for Portugal. A relative handful of super-rich, parasitic families benefited immensely from it. It is said that 35 families had more wealth than the rest of the 8.5 million Portuguese people combined. The colonies were also a place where Portugal's "excess" population could migrate, continue to speak their native tongue and racially feel themselves part of the white ruling elite.

But an increasingly large burden fell on the backs of the Portuguese people. They had to provide the manpower and means by which to subdue, control and administer the vast, far-off territories. While guerrilla warfare reached a peak in the decade prior to the overthrow of Caetano, the colonial peoples always resisted occupation and foreign oppression, fighting in whatever ways they could. Portugal also was compelled to ward off attempts by other European powers to grab some of "her" possessions. In time, however, lacking a sufficiently developed economic base and technology, and the necessary capital reserves, Portugal had to "permit" the ever greater economic penetration of the colonies by the giant monopolies of the big capitalist-imperialist powers.

Gulf Oil, for example, is the largest U.S. holding in Angola, extracting some 145,000 barrels of oil a day. But

most of this is shipped to the United States, Japan and European markets. Only eight percent of this production went to Portugal, despite her need to import the great bulk of her oil from abroad, at an exorbitant cost.

Dramatic proof that the spoils of empire did not go to the Portuguese people can be seen in the conditions of the country and the lot of its people. Portugal is the least developed country in Europe, both in industry and agriculture. She has the lowest per capita income, the highest rate of infant mortality, the lowest life expectancy, and the highest rate of illiteracy in Europe. Her rate of infant mortality is four times that of Sweden and 40 percent higher than that of Italy. From 33 to 35 percent of the population is admittedly illiterate, with about 60 to 70 percent considered functionally illiterate. They can read a little, but can barely read and comprehend a printed page.

About 40 percent of the people are still on the land, but Portuguese agriculture is backward, unable to feed its own people. Large quantities of grain must be imported from abroad. Portugal's wheat yield per acre is about half that of other European counties with comparable natural conditions. About 800,000 agricultural laborers and tenant farmers owned not a foot of land themselves, yet 2,600 large estates occupied more land than the other 780,000 farms combined. In other words, about three percent of landowners held more acreage than the other 97 percent. Many of the huge estates belonged to absentee dukes and barons, or were in the hands of banks, insurance companies and corporations, and were largely uncultivated.

THE PORTUGUESE economy was backward and advanced at the same time. It was backward in the sense that only 23 percent of the work force was employed in industry and 90 percent of all enterprises employed fewer than ten people. It was advanced, in the sense of a high concentration of capital. A handful of powerful

monopoly groupings controlled four-fifths of the nation's wealth. The Melos, Champalimaud and Espirito Santos families, often interlocked through marriage and financial ties, completely dominated economic life. The Melo dynasty alone, through its control of the conglomerate, CUF—since nationalized—controlled 250 firms, including a leading bank and three of the largest insurance companies. Champalimaud controlled 150 foreign and domestic firms. And many of the small enterprises were also under the heels of the big monopolies through subcontracting and the control of bank credit, raw materials and energy. This is why Alvaro Cunhal, the General-Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party told his Party's congress in October, 1974, that economic power was still wielded by the monopolists and latifundia owners. This situation, he said, could not last. "Either the monopolists and large landowners will regain political power and restore dictatorship, or the revolution will end their power in the interests of building a democratic Portugal."

As a consequence of both underdevelopment and monopoly control, the workers were bitterly exploited. When for the first time in the country's history a minimum wage law came into effect in the period after April 25, it raised the wages of 50 to 70 percent of the workers. The minimum wage is approximately $150 a month. Only 40 percent of Portuguese homes have their own water supply, and only 17 percent of the urban population is served by a public sewage system.

As we travelled through Portugal—Lisbon, Caldas da Rainha, Nazaré, Alcobaca, Leiria, Coimbra, Oporto, Braga, Ponte de Linea, Ponte da Barca, Viana de Costelo, Ofir, Viseu, Santarem and back to Lisbon, we were constantly shocked at the sight of widespread child labor. We stayed at hotels where bus boys and bellhops were only 11 and 12 years old. A bus boy in our hotel in Oporto told us he was 10 years old. Children are employed in stores and factories as well. We visited the

Secca metal plant at the outskirts of Oporto, once owned by some of Caetano's relatives who fled to England. The plant has now been taken over by its workers and is being run as a cooperative enterprise. They told us, "We asked the government to be nationalized, but they aren't ready yet." As we walked into the plant we were astonished to see from 30 to 40 youngsters who were 13 to 15 years of age. They were working on machines and benches, usually under the supervision of an older worker. While there is legislation providing for compulsory education, we were told that few children are able to attend for more than three years before it is necessary for them to join the work force. Children rarely attend school beyond the age of 13, and in many interior regions, "compulsory" means far less than the dictionary definition of the word.

LOW WAGES, peasant poverty and considerable unemployment have brought with them another evil. From 1.5 million to 2 million Portuguese have migrated in recent years to other West European countries, particularly West Germany, France, and Britain, in search of work. These are not emigrants who move to settle in another land. They are Portuguese citizens, mainly fathers and sons, who leave their families to work at somewhat higher wages in another country. We went through farm communities in the North where nearly all the work was being done by women, with only old men and young boys to help. The migrants send a considerable portion of their earnings home, return during vacation time, and use their extra cash to make repairs on old farmhouses or, as in many instances, build new homes, adding a bit more to the foundation every time they return home.

THE WRETCHED poverty in many areas of Portuguese society is related to another important factor. Portugal was a colonial power, oppressing 16 million other

peoples, but was at the same time a dependent country, dominated by others.

In one of the issues of the *MFA Information Bulletin* (August 14, 1975), an extremely important article appeared: "National Independence—What Road to Take?—Some Reflections." This explained that the Portuguese economy was dependent upon four countries—West Germany, Britain, the United States and France. About 80 percent of foreign trade has been with these four; about 12 percent, with the former colonies; only 1.0 percent with the socialist countries, and the remaining 7 percent with the rest of the world.

It is the nature of this foreign trade that tells the full story. Portugal's exports are mainly agricultural and processed agricultural goods—grapes and wine, olive oil, fish and canned sardines, cork and cork products, wool and textiles. Her major imports are industrial products—oil, coal, iron ore, machinery, vehicles, airplanes, and sophisticated electronic equipment. What she sells abroad, therefore, are mainly low-priced, competitive, non-manufactured goods, and what she buys abroad are highly monopoly-priced items. This has led to a constant deficit in the balance of payments. In 1971, Portugal's exports amounted to $1 billion; her imports, to $1.7 billion. The difference was made up in two ways: remittances sent home by migrant workers in Western Europe, and tourism. More than three million foreign tourists visited Portugal in 1971.

It is important to note that both of these additional foreign currency tributaries have now been drying up. The public-scare campaign directed against the new Portugal in the media of the United States and Western Europe has frightened away most foreign tourists. And the economic crisis which grips western capitalism has substantially reduced the number of Portuguese workers employed in other countries.

It is this combination of economic backwardness, monopolistic control, and economic dependence, which

has led the Portuguese Communist Party to challenge the view of the Portuguese Socialist Party leadership that the revolution can be halted at some half-way street of a bourgeois, social-democracy such as exists in West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Britain, and elsewhere. The low level of Portuguese industrial development, the backward nature of its agriculture, the specific characteristics of its economy, the competition it faces in capitalist world markets, and the problem of unequal exchange, all demand so high a rate of workers' exploitation that only a government regime of repression can bring it about. And the greater the dependence upon western imperialism, the greater must be the exploitation to pay for this. Hence in Portugal it must be one way or the other—either a course which leads to socialism, or a course that pushes the nation back to fascism. There is no middle choice.

4. Class Conflict

WHEN the euphoric shouting and cheering had subsided and the wilted carnations and confetti were swept from the streets of Portuguese cities and towns, it became ever more evident that the removal of a dictator does not automatically assure the people a new and better life. It didn't take many days before demonstrations of general jubilation also took on a cutting edge. People wanted the fascists cleansed from every level of government, with severe punishment for those guilty of crimes against the people. (There was indignation and outrage when Spínola later permitted Caetano and his camarilla of political thugs to leave the country scot free.) Workers protested and rebelled against intolerable working conditions, began to organize unions on a mass scale, and strikes broke out before the legal right to strike was established. Landless peasants and agricultural workers began to demand agrarian reform based on giving the land to those who tilled it, and more and more of the demonstrations called for an immediate end to the war and independence for the colonies.

It became quickly evident that the Portuguese working class, kept down for five decades, had a level of class consciousness and militancy that few observers had thought possible only yesterday. There could be no doubt that the working class was determined to leave its mark on the course of events.

On April 29, only four days after the overthrow, the *New York Times* carried a dispatch from its Lisbon correspondent which said:

The leftists' eagerness to show their power in the streets has apparently disturbed Gen. Spinola, who warned newspaper editors and political leaders yesterday that he might have to use force to prevent anarchy in the country.

This did not halt—what the *New York Times* referred to as—the "tumultous" welcome given Alvaro Cunhal upon his return to Lisbon on April 30, after 11 years of imprisonment and 12 years of exile. Hoisted on an armored carrier by young army officers, the Communist leader addressed the assembled mass saying, "No other scene so dramatically illustrates the turnover in Portuguese life that has followed the toppling of the right-wing dictatorship of almost 50 years . . ." He called for unity of the people with the Movement of the Armed Forces and for an end to the war based on granting independence to Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, and the other colonies. Thus he took direct issue with Spínola's aim of a Portuguese federation of so-called equal states.

May 1, 1974, was historic. What many had seen as solely a military uprising only five days earlier was transformed on May Day into a mighty peoples' movement. In a city of bout one million inhabitants, nearly a half-million halted all work and came into the streets in joyous celebration of the international workers' holiday. Red flags were proudly displayed, and the slogans, "A people united can never be defeated," and "Long live the unity of the armed forces and the people," predominated. But there were also slogans for nationalization, agrarian reform, solidarity with the people of Chile, with the socialist countries, and for a revolutionary democracy moving in the direction of socialism.

This display of workers' consciousness, unity and might had two effects. It strengthened the hand of those in the armed forces movement who also wanted basic revolutionary change. But it also frightened the ruling class out of its wits, including the so-called liberal ele-

ments, and firmed up their determination to get the evil genii of revolution back into its Pandora's box—by guile, if possible; by force, if necessary.

This position of the ruling class was only a repeat of past Portuguese history. Portugal is one of the countries where feudal-clerical interests, customs and traditions, were always used to abort even the mildest attempts to institute reforms, including bourgeois-democratic ones. Semi-feudal conditions had deep roots in the countryside and in the latifundia system. In the interior of the country, the Catholic church hierarchy preferred ignorance and obscurantism to education, and opposed any movement toward progressive change and reform. Both the large landowners and merchant capitalists preferred tribute from the colonies and profit from commerce with them, to internal modernization and industrialization. The failure to divide up the huge estates among the landless peasants, and to raise the standard of living of the workers, restricted the size of the internal market and with it a more rapid development of capitalism. When attempts at bourgeois-democratic reforms were undertaken, they were half-hearted, feeble and late. The support that came from the coastal urban centers was more than made up for by the sweep of clerical, semi-feudal reaction from the interior. Later, as the working class began to assume consciousness and an independent program of demands, those sections of the bourgeoisie that would have favored reform previously became frightened by any measures that would open the door to working class organization, political struggle and ascendancy.

Until 1910, Portugal was a monarchy. Only after the abdication of King Manuel II, following a short two year reign and after a half-century of instability and recurring political crises, was a republic proclaimed and certain liberal reforms instituted. In 1911, a democratic constitution was written granting workers the right to organize and strike. A rash of strikes was the consequence.

Instead of making concessions to the workers, the employers called upon the authorities to use force, producing repeated violent collisions between police and workers. Finally, the backbone of the movement was broken by the police surrounding the trade union center in Lisbon, arresting hundreds within it, and padlocking its doors.

A similar pattern repeated itself afterward. In 1919 and 1920, a wave of strikes took place, of railroad, metal, municipal, streetcar, maritime, printshop and electrical workers. At the same time landless peasants in Portugal's southern great-plain country demanded the breaking up of large estates, and land for themselves.

Faced with this mounting class struggle, the government had no solution to offer. Thus one government crisis only led to another and the country was left in a state of complete instability. In 1920 alone, there were nine changes of government, one of them lasting a mere 24 hours and another only 6 days. Efforts to describe the history of Portugal in those months degenerates into a weary story of short-lived cabinets and their quick overthrow. In 1925 there were five different governments in the course of a single year.

Finally, the end came on May 28, 1926. A military coup, led by Gen. Gomes da Costa, (not to be confused with President da Costa Gomes), removed all pretense of democratic rule. In July, 1926, General Carmona took over and, in November of the same year became Acting President. In 1928 he called Dr. Antonio De Oliviera Salazar, a professor of economics at the University of Coimbra, to become Finance Minister. In 1932, Salazar was named Premier, a position he held until Sept. 29, 1968, when , paralyzed by a stroke, he was replaced by Dr. Marcello Caetano. For 48 years the term "Premier" became a euphemism for dictator.

Thus Portugal's history bears out the contention of the Portuguese Communist Party that bourgeois democratic rule and liberal reform are untenable for Portugal. In the

words of the great German genius, Goethe, the workers and common people must be the hammer, or they will be the anvil.*

*Learn to be more wise in time.
On the mighty scales of fortune
Rarely is the index still.
You must rise or you must sink,
You must either rule and win,
Or you'll have to serve and lose,
Choose to suffer or to triumph,
Anvil or the hammer be.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1749-1832

5. Counterrevolution

THE strategy of the monopolies, the big landowners and the moneyed interests since April 25, 1974, has been to halt and reverse the revolutionary course as soon as possible and by the most effective means available. Their general line of tactics has varied, however, and can be divided into two periods—the first, up to March 11, 1975, and the second, the period that followed it.

At the outset, reaction pinned its hopes on its man in the key government post, Provisional President Spinola. Although Spinola had veered in a "liberal" direction on the problem of the colonies, the ruling class knew that he had not become Provisional President to help dismantle the empire. They also knew that he would readily and rapidly shed any touch of liberalism in face of any popular threat to the power and dominance of the economic ruling elite of which he was a member.

To turn back the democratic tide would not, however, be easy. The mood of the country was definitely for revolutionary change, and for moving in a socialist direction. It was therefore necessary to ride with the tide until the opportunity arose for reversing course. Thus, the Provisional Government he named, with the approval of the Revolutionary Council of the MFA, consisted of representation from all the main democratic currents—including the Socialists and Communists. Mario Soares, Socialist leader, was named Foreign Minister, and Alvaro Cunhal, Minister without portfolio. Adelino de Palma Carlos, a liberal law professor with no political background, was named Premier.

Spinola's first efforts aimed at trying to lull the armed

forces movement into quietly departing from the political scene. Although himself a member of the Revolutionary Council, he sought to convince people that with the armed overthrow accomplished, there was no further political role for the armed forces to fulfill. One young army officer who had risked his all in participating in the April 25 mutiny, told how shocked he was at a speech he heard Spínola deliver to army officers only a few weeks after the coup. In effect he told them: "You've done a fine job boys, but now you can go back to your barracks and with confidence leave the job of running the country to us older experienced hands." He was less than convincing. The revolutionary-minded MFA officers believed it more necessary than ever to raise revolutionary and socialist consciousness among the people. This organized effort on their part became known as the "dynamization campaign."

Unable to remove the MFA from the scene, responsible to its Revolutionary Council for his position and acts, Spínola set out to attain for himself a popular mandate over and above that of the armed forces movement. With the collaboration of Premier de Palma Carlos, he started a maneuver to push through a rapid presidential referendum election. This, he believed, would end his provisional status as president and give him the power he needed. But the clumsy maneuver backfired. It was too obviously a grab for personal power. The country was not yet prepared for an election, free political life had barely begun, and it had generally been agreed that the first election would be for a Constituent Assembly to write the basic democratic framework within which national elections could be held.

As a result, in July, 1974, Premier Carlos was compelled to resign and Spínola's new nominee to take his place was turned down by the Revolutionary Council. It demanded that the new premier be Vasco Goncalves, a member of the Revolutionary Council and seen by many

as the intellectual leader of the armed forces movement and the April 25 overthrow.

Thus, the attempt to grab power against the revolution was turned into its opposite. Instead of being weakened, the revolutionary forces in the country and within the government were immensely strengthened. Vasco Goncalves was the very opposite of Palma Carlos and Antonio Spínola. He was a modest man, dedicated to the revolution and to its socialist goal.

In face of this defeat, and the accelerated program of the government for colonial independence, nationalization and agrarian reform, Spínola decided to gamble on a forcible seizure of power. Over the head of the government, he appealed—á la Richard Nixon—to the "silent majority" to assert itself against what he called "totalitarian extremism." He called on this "majority" to march on Lisbon to impose its will. The day set for the demonstration was Saturday, September 28, 1974.

No sooner did the people and their organizations learn of this planned confrontation, than they mustered their forces to defend the revolution, with arms if necessary. Together with the MFA, over 100,000 people set up barricades across highways, checked and controlled all road transport, and physically prevented a convergence on Lisbon. On the night before the scheduled massing, Spínola called out paratroopers he believed loyal to him personally. When the response was negative, he knew the jig was up. He called off the action and resigned his post as Provisional President. Premier Vasco Goncalves, speaking for the Provisional Government, told the nation that it had just passed through "the first attack" of reaction against the revolution.

In cleaning up the counterrevolutionary nests preparing for the September 28 showdown, large quantities of arms, ammunition and high powered radio equipment were found. One counterrevolutionary group had actually drawn up a list of those to be "summarily executed"

and a plan for the conversion of the Lisbon bull-fighting ring and football field into concentration camps. A bizarre side of this sorry affair is that this same plan also called for the assassination of Spínola and then to pin the blame for this on the Communists, in much the same way that the Reichstag fire of 1933 was used by the German Nazis.

Once again, the attempt to destroy the revolution only strengthened it. To replace Spínola, Gen. Costa Gomes was named as Provisional President. General Costa Gomes also came from the top army hierarchy, had worked closely with Spínola, but broke with him over revolutionary policy. Costa Gomes favored independence for the colonies, agrarian reform, and the nationalization of the dominant monopolies. He also saw socialism as the goal of the revolution. While not as radical as Goncalves, he worked closely with the premier and defended him from attackers and detractors. Gen. Spínola and two of his supporters on the Revolutionary Council were dropped from membership.

Made even more desperate by the ouster of Spínola as Provisional President and as a member of the Revolutionary Council, and furious at the accelerated leftward course of the revolution, the counterrevolutionary forces began to prepare for another—a military attempt—to overthrow the government. This plot came to a head on March 11, 1975.

Less than 24 hours earlier, Alvaro Cunhal warned the nation that the reactionaries were launching a new offensive in an attempt to rapidly alter the political situation. He repeated earlier appeals for consultations with the Socialist Party for common action to thwart a reactionary coup. "There is no time to lose," he said, "because what is possible today can become extraordinarily difficult in a few days time if the situation continues to deteriorate."

The first target of the attempted coup on March 11, 1975, was the capture of the anti-aircraft-artillery head-

quarters protecting the Lisbon airforce base. Its seizure was necessary to gain control of the Lisbon airport. A company of paratroopers, told that they were being sent to "put down a left-wing revolt," landed near the anti-aircraft headquarters and began to prepare for the assault. But before this could unfold, a huge crowd of ordinary people, "including mothers with babes in their arms," rushed between the barracks and the paratroopers. Confronted with this mass of people barring the way, the paratroopers wavered, refused to fire, and halted the attack. In another instance, when reactionary members of the Republican Guard seized their own progressive commanders, thousands of ordinary people surrounded the post and prevented them from leaving.

In this way an alerted people, warned of possible military treachery, and with the help of the MFA, put down the attempted coup in less than three hours. Spínola and the other conspiring generals fled by helicoptor to Spain once it became evident that their plot had failed. Also involved in the conspiracy was Gen. Galvao de Melo, an original member of the revolutionary junta and the former head of the airforce. He had been removed from the Revolutionary Council after the September 28, 1974, attempted coup.

Portugal now moved even further to the Left. As the monopoly corporations, the banks, insurance companies and the large landowning interests, had been involved in the conspiracy, the revolution moved to defend itself. Nearly all banks, 35 insurance companies, and the biggest of the monopoly combinations were nationalized. Landless peasants and agricultural laborers were encouraged to occupy more of the large estates whose acres were not being cultivated.

Thus each attempt to throttle the revolution had only made it stronger and more determined to pursue its course. It became clear that in any attempt at direct assault upon the revolution and the government, the

people and army would rally behind them. In any Right-Left confrontation, the Left would win. A new tactical course would have to be found, if the revolution was to be stopped and reversed.

6. Soares Veers to the Right

AFTER the failure of the Spinola attempt in September, it became clearer that direct assault tactics were accomplishing the opposite of what the Right wanted. What was needed was some way by which to weaken the Left, to split and divide it from within, before direct assault tactics could hope to succeed. The March 11 counterrevolutionary fiasco only made this doubly clear.

The way to divide the Left was to throw support to the Portuguese Socialist Party of Mario Soares, and to pit it against the Portuguese Communist Party. The way to accomplish this was to refurbish the old weapon of anticommunism and to use it against all who were pushing the revolution further to the Left, especially against the Provisional Government headed by Premier Goncalves, and against him personally.

That Mario Soares soon lent himself to this maneuver is not surprising. His orientation and perspective were not revolutionary, but social-democratic. He had been forced to the Left on the question of radical agrarian reform and the nationalization of the monopolies for fear of becoming isolated, but his real bent was in another direction. His advisors and mentors were the leaders of the West German Social-Democratic Party, and to a somewhat lesser extent those from the Scandinavian countries and the Labor Party of Great Britain.

These social-democratic formations were greatly concerned with events in Portugal. If the revolution there succeeded it would have an affect on all West European politics. The Portuguese revolution was the first upsurge

of this kind in Western Europe since the German Revolution toward the end of World War I. Its example could become contagious, especially under deteriorating economic conditions for which social democracy had no answer. Also, West Germany was Portugal's main trading partner, with considerable investments in Portugal's economy and in the former Portuguese colonies. What happened in Portugal was therefore of considerable importance to West German capitalist interests.

While desirous of preventing a truly socialist transformation of Portugal, right-wing social democracy preferred that this not happen by a counterrevolutionary coup that would reinstitute a fascist regime. It had reason to fear such a course, remembering what happened to European social democracy when fascism took over in one country after another in the '30s and until fascism was defeated in World War II. Large scale support for the Portuguese Socialist Party was therefore a logical answer.

U.S. imperialism had also shown considerable alarm with developments in Portugal. Before April 25, neither the *New York Times*, nor the State Department, made any protestations against the brutal mass repression by Portuguese fascism for 48 long years. There were no editorials in the press, no statements by the government, loans and credits were readily granted, substantial military aid given, and Portugal was considered one of "our" countries in the "free world," an integral part of NATO.

But once the fascist regime was overthrown, the U.S. government and the press began to bemoan the so-called lack of democracy in Portugal and warned against the menace of "Communism."

The CIA, which formerly was quite content with Portugal's fascist way of life, now bestirred itself and began to work in whatever way it could to undermine the new development. We shall subsequently discuss at considerable length the interventionist activities of the State

Department, the CIA, and the multi-national corporations, against the Portuguese revolution. But at this point we merely want to indicate that on the part of U.S. imperialism there has been great concern with events in Portugal and a policy aimed at halting and reversing developments there by one way or another.

At first, secret support was given to those preparing to forcibly overthrow the government. And even now, in both Brazil and Spain, the CIA works closely with the exiled generals, industrialists, bankers and large landowners, preparing nests of saboteurs, espionage agents, and land and sea convoys to bring arms and ammunition to counterrevolutionary groups within the country. There is evidence that some 30,000 rifles and ammunition crossed the Spanish frontier into Northern Portugal, to arm a secret fascist "liberation army." (While we were in Portugal, uncontrolled forest fires raged in different parts of the country, started from planes by saboteurs.)

But U.S. imperialism, too, has not been averse to using right-wing social democracy for its ends. Stories in the press have indicated that the U.S. government has been contributing, through social-democratic conduits in Western Europe, from four to ten million dollars a month. While Mario Soares and the West European Social Democratic parties and labor unions have denied this allegation, the U.S. State Department has refused to do so.

The first major effort to split the government coalition and the Portuguese labor movement occurred in January, 1975. The issue in dispute was a labor bill pending before the Provisional Government. It had to do with whether the labor law would establish a single labor federation or multiple ones. It was over this issue that a major blow-up occurred, with the Socialist Party and the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) sharply opposed to the Communist Party and the majority of the government.

What is the background of this controversy? Under fascism, there were no democratic unions. There were

corporate unions composed of workers and management and tightly prescribed by law, and with no right to strike. But even then the regime took no chances. The workers were split up into 326 separate unions, so that workers in different workshops, even of the same employer, or workers in large plants with varied crafts and trades found it difficult to act in unison when it came to negotiating with the companies.

But even under fascism, particularly in the last years of its rule, an illegal network of democratic unions was organized which by 1970 was so strong that a national conference was held at which an underground labor federation was formed, called Intersindical. After April 25, 1974, a mighty movement of self-organization developed among the Portuguese workers with the result that some 2 million workers were organized in a total working class of about 2.5 million. This is a higher percentage of labor organization than in any capitalist country in the world. These unions became part of Intersindical, which established a network of city and regional bodies, and in August 1975, held its first post-liberation national trade union congress.

Intersindical is organized along strictly democratic lines, with few full-time officials and most of the leaders themselves workers on a job. We spent an evening meeting with the three young leaders of the Oporto Intersindical at its headquarters. They reported that there were forty-nine unions in the city and that all of them are affiliated to Intersindical. Each union gets one percent of a worker's wages as union dues. Six percent of this goes to Intersindical. The three young men we met with are not full time functionaries; Intersindical has none in Oporto. They are voluntary workers, contributing of their spare time to the labor federation. Because of their elected positions, they make arrangements with their employers so that they work different time shifts, thus enabling at least one of them to be on hand in case of need. If the emergency or need is such as to require

more of their time, they are paid for the hours lost at work, but no more than they would have earned on the job.

The charge has been made that the Communists "grabbed" control of unions after April 25. The truth is that Communists did have a major influence in the organization of the workers under fascism and were instrumental in helping to set up the illegal Intersindical labor federation. They have been a strong influential force in it ever since. But there was no "grabbing." Workers chose their own leaders, although it took time before a national congress could be convened. But not very much time when one considers that only sixteen months intervened between liberation and the August, 1975, congress of the trade union movement.

In Oporto, a delegated council of labor meets once a month, with every local union represented, and decides the policies of Intersindical in that city. This same form of organization exists in other cities and towns as well.

The three young trade union leaders we met with were all in their twenties. It was difficult for us to imagine a central trades and labor council in one of our own cities with so young a leadership. But we understood this better after talking with them, and after visiting the Secca plant. When factory workers begin to work at 13, they have had a decade of labor experience by the time they are 23.

THE NEW labor law adopted by the Provisional Government in January, 1975, with the approval of the MFA, established one labor federation in the country. It is this which was challenged by the Portuguese Socialist Party leadership in the government, and by the Popular Democratic Party—a party which the *New York Times* refers to as "center," but which is really Right, as we shall later show.

The dispute over Intersindical broke out suddenly and furiously. For months the projected new labor law had

been discussed in shops, offices and local unions across the land. Workers' assemblies were convened where the bill was discussed, amendments proposed, and a vote taken pro and con. These assemblies overwhelmingly supported the bill and its proviso for a single labor federation. In fact, the members of the Portuguese Socialist Party in the trade union movement raised no objections to this proposal when it came up for ratification in their own unions. Only after the discussions in the labor movement had ended, and the bill was being considered for final action in the Cabinet, did the spokesmen for the PSP and the PPD take exception to a single federation, charging that this was undemocratic, an abridgment of trade union democracy, and a scheme by which the Communists could maintain mechanical control over the organized labor movement.

Of course, Mario Soares and the other Socialist leaders had a right to change their minds. But a few facts should be noted which may throw some light on why they changed their minds.

Soares' opposition to a single trade union federation seems to have started after a visit to Portugal by Irving Brown, formerly of the CIA-subsidized International Department of the AFL-CIO. It is this same Irving Brown who played a sinister role in engineering the split in the world trade union movement and in the labor movements of France and Italy.

When World War II ended, the labor movements of Europe and most of the rest of the world were set on establishing a single, united world federation of trade unions. The CIO in the United States, the British, French, Italian and Soviet trade unions had jointly taken steps to form a single world trade union center. Irving Brown, operating for the reactionary leadership of the American Federation of Labor, and for the newly formed CIA, used huge sums of CIA funds to bribe labor leaders, and to convince right-wing social democrats that their interests lay in a split labor movement as against

unity with the Communists. Thus, in time, the World Federation of Trade Unions was split and ever since then two world labor federations have existed. In France and Italy, where the Communist influence in labor's ranks was great, Brown also convinced both Catholic and Socialist leaders not to form a single federation, but their own separate ones. To this day, after more than a quarter-of-a-century, the trade union movements in France and Italy are broken up along ideological lines, with one labor federation led largely by Communists, another by Socialists, and a third by Catholics. As a result, the workers have often been divided in facing their employers. Only in recent years, and largely through the efforts of the Communists, have these separate federations joined hands in strikes and other struggles and there is hope that some day they will be united in one common organization and movement.

The charge that the Communists want a single federation as a means of automatically controlling it, is groundless. The labor law includes safeguards regarding the holding of union elections, the democratic voting procedures, and so on, and these were supported by the Communists. Under this law, there is a guarantee that the unions will have the political coloration that their members want. Where workers want Socialists in leadership, or members of the PPD, or of any other party or group, or of no political affiliation, they have the full right to elect these. But whatever the political coloration of the leadership, there is a guarantee that the workers will stand united when facing their employers.

According to Wilfred Burchett, writing in the *Guardian*, the trade union dispute was a "side issue used to cloud up the more important question of economic law." What Soares was really opposed to but did not dare to openly challenge, were two other measures pending for action—an anti-monopoly bill and a decree making it a crime to leave unproductive lands idle. It is to this increasing thrust against the power of the monopolies and

the large landlords that Soares and his PPD allies were most strongly opposed. But knowing the sentiment in the country, they did not dare create a governmental crisis over them. It was easier to do so over the contrived issue of "Communist domination of the trade unions."

When the showdown came, the PSP and PPD did not dare leave the government over the trade union dispute. The proposed law was too overwhelmingly supported by the workers to win adherents for the PSP position in the councils of the MFA. The bill became law.

But the political waters had been muddied, anti-communism had been given another whirl, and it was abundantly clear that the PSP leadership had veered sharply to the Right.

In a major policy speech on January 18, 1975, Cunhal, speaking for the leadership of the PCP, asked the PSP leadership to clearly and unequivocally explain its general line. "We invite the Portuguese Socialist Party to define who are its friends and who are its enemies. Does the Socialist Party want an alliance with the Communist Party and other such democratic forces against reaction, or does it want an alliance with rightist conservative forces against the Portuguese Communist Party and other revolutionary forces."

The April 25, 1975, elections for the Constituent Assembly gave the answer to that question.

7. The Elections

SHORTLY after liberation, the armed forces movement promised the nation that an election for a constitutional assembly would be held within a year. Living up to this pledge, the first anniversary of April 25 was set as election day.

The MFA feared, however, that the election would be used to arouse partisan political passions, and that its results could be utilized to obstruct or impede the further development of the revolution. It therefore insisted that every participating party in the election sign its name in advance to an agreed-upon pact of understanding to the effect that the MFA would continue to occupy the pivotal role in government for a period of from three to five years, and that the approaching election be understood as being exclusively related to the choosing of representatives to draft a constitution covering a transitional period.

That the MFA had good reason to fear an election at the time has, unfortunately, been borne out by events. The period since the election has been one of protracted political crisis, with the PSP and PPD—the two largest vote getters—using the results to claim a popular mandate for taking political power and shifting policy toward the Right.

The PCP was not in favor of so early an election. But it could not prevent it. The PCP argued that not enough time had elapsed; that the process of political enlightenment had barely begun; that there were regions in which the same economic and political forces that held

sway prior to the overthrow still did; that the PCP and other Left groups were still being repressed in these areas; and that there would have to be a greater guarantee of democratic liberties before an election would truly reflect the real relationship of forces in the country. It also had reason to suspect that the PSP and PPD were entering into an alliance directed against the best interests of the revolution.

In Cunhal's major policy speech on January 18, 1975, previously quoted, he addressed himself squarely to this question. He asked the PSP leaders to "clearly and unequivocally state whether after the elections they plan to continue in coalition with the Communists, or whether they plan a policy of coalition with the reactionary Right to the exclusion of the Communist Party and against the Communist Party. Whether they want unity with the democratic forces or unity with the reactionary Right."

MANY Americans find it difficult to understand why there are times when elections serve the opposite of a democratic purpose. They do not give sufficient thought to the fact that elections in a capitalist society are always weighted in favor of the class that holds economic power. Money talks, it is known, and never as loud as in an election. Nelson Rockefeller, the billionaire, has only one vote, the same as, say, Nelson Smith, who is unemployed, or Mary Smith, who works in a factory. But this is only so on the superficial surface; it is only part of the mythology. The truth is far different. The Rockefeller fortune, the banks and conglomerates of which he is part owner, their interlocking ties with the newspapers, TV and radio, his ability to spend millions of dollars in behalf of himself as candidate, or for other candidates, to buy votes and bribe officials, enables him to influence an election, often in a decisive way.

But the Rockefellers are not the only super-rich in this

country. They are part of a class of super-rich. When this class is divided over one or another question, the intervention of the popular mass can change things somewhat. And often the pressure of the people will cause divisions in the upper crust of society as to how to meet the people's thrust. But when the ruling class is united, the trump cards are nearly always in its hands when it comes to elections. It takes a highly enlightened and united people, and tight control over the monied interests, to turn an election into a victory over the ruling class.

Portugal does not have men as wealthy as the Rockefellers. But it does have an economic ruling class with great means and power. Even with the nationalizations of the banks and monopoly corporations, the members of the ruling class still had vast fortunes to spend. Their incentive to spend large sums was very great because they feared that the revolution in process would, unless stopped, divest them of all their wealth.

THERE is another thing to consider. Revolutions are not ordinary occurrences. The fascist regime was not overthrown by an election. It was ousted by force—military force. In a revolutionary period the normal rules of the game—and "normal" implies that these rules were established by the former ruling class—are set aside and new revolutionary rules replace them. It is a time of great ferment and turbulence, of immense change in peoples' ways of thinking, and the mass learns more in months than it formerly learned in decades.

The polarization of issues confronts masses with a need to choose sides, for it is a time of decision; it is one side or the other. But not all are ready to make that decision. Many want change, yet fear it. By a process of osmosis they have all their lives accepted values and truisms that are those of the ruling class. They may even hate their oppressors, and yet accept the notion that it is

natural for society to have rulers and ruled. They lack confidence in themselves and in people like themselves to govern and run things without bosses and the educated stratum which serves the rulers.

This is especially so in a country such as Portugal, with a large peasantry, and with backward mountainous regions cut off from the urban centers, where so much of the population is illiterate and in the grip of religious fanatacism and obscurantism, and where the church bishop and priest are the political as well as the spiritual leaders of their "flock."

Hence in a period of revolutionary change what determines the outcome of things is not an abstract numerical majority, but a majority of those actively and consciously involved. The American Revolution was won on the battlefield, often by tattered armies using guerrilla tactics first learned from the Indians. The war lasted seven years, but a Constitutional Convention was not convened until eleven years after the Declaration of Independence, and the first national election was not held until thirteen years after 1776.

Yet the American Revolution, as important as it was, did not aim at a change in property relations within the country. It freed the colonies from British domination and from paying tribute to the Crown, but it did not touch the properties of the wealthy landowners and merchants. These remained wealthy; the enslaved Blacks remained enslaved; the many debtors, indentured servants, laborers and poor farmers, remained poor.

The aim of the Portuguese revolution is more profound; to transform the economic-social structure so that those at the bottom come to the top and a new society is built in which class exploitation and oppression are ended.

THE RESULTS of the election to the Constitutional Assembly were as follows: 38 percent of the vote went to

the PSP; 26 percent to the PPD; 12.5 percent to the PCP; 5 percent to the MDP (Portuguese Democratic Movement), a formation closely allied with the PCP; 2 percent for five small left groupings; 7 percent for the CDS (Social Democratic Center), an extreme rightist party; and 7 percent of the ballots were blank.

What explains the high vote for the Portuguese Socialist Party and the relatively low one for the PCP? We asked this question of a number of people and from their replies the following facts emerged.

Contrary to what one would think, the PSP is not a strong organization. In most places, it hardly exists as an organization. We asked our friend Alex, whether efforts had been made by the PCP in Ovar to establish united front relations with members of the PSP. "The problem we have," he answered, "is that the PSP has no real organization in Ovar; it is hard to find any who claim to be members." Of course, this is not the full answer to the problem, for there are many people who voted for the PSP and it's a matter of establishing relations with them. Alex admitted that on this score there are problems among some Communists who carry over their antagonism to PSP leadership policies into a treatment of all PSP supporters as being smaller replicas of Mario Soares.

But the lack of PSP organization of Ovar corresponds to the situation in most other places. A visit to the PSP headquarters in Lisbon found it far from the beehive that was the PCP center. Yet the PSP received 38 percent of the vote.

One reason for the lack of PSP organization and structure has to do with the fact that it is a relatively new party. It was formed in 1973, a year before the overthrow, and grew out of a group known as *Accao Socialista Portuguesa*, Portuguese Socialist Action.

Actually, until the PCP came into existence the main working class tradition in Portugal was anarchist, although Marxist thought had influence and some or-

ganization for a hundred years. Over the years the Communists replaced the anarchists and became the main organized force in the Portuguese working class. Even today, despite its large vote, the PSP organization is still largely composed of a variety of office seekers—something like bourgeois political parties everywhere, and like the Republican and Democratic Party organizations in this country. Bert Cochran, writing in the *Nation*, describes the Portuguese PSP as "a coterie of lawyers, government functionaries and newspaper editors, held together by reciprocal logrolling."

What then explains its high vote? First, socialism is on everyone's tongue in Portugal. It is difficult to find anyone in public life who does not favor socialism—at least in words. Even the more openly rightist parties—the CDS—calls itself the Social Democratic Center. It is like the German Nazis who called themselves the National Socialist Party.

The MFA, in its nationwide barnstorming campaign of "dynamization," also kept reiterating the need for socialism. Thus it is not surprising that people who heard so much about socialism should decide to vote for the party of that name. Especially, when many were illiterate, and many others were politically unprepared to distinguish between socialism and *socialism*.

Also, in a country where anticommunism had been the basis for all official propaganda under fascism, and for so many years, the lack of understanding of what the Communists stand for, the fear that they may threaten liberty and rights, is also not to be discounted. Thus, many voted for a socialism they thought free of such dangers.

Recognizing that every vote it could take away from the PCP would be a vote for it, the Socialist leadership made their main campaign against the PCP. On the eve of the April 25, 1975, election, Wilfred Burchett wrote from Lisbon: "The Socialist Party will probably get the biggest vote, because it has the support of the moderate

and extreme right and some elements of the left. It has based its campaign mainly on 'democracy and liberty' and an appeal to an anticommunism to which the Portuguese people have been conditioned during the 48 years under fascism."

When Burchett referred to the "extreme right" as also supporting the PSP, he was correct. Support for this appears in an interview from Lisbon by Paul Cowan, special correspondent of the New York *Village Voice*, with Gen. Galvao de Melo. This general who had been associated with Spinola in the attempted coup, admitted "quite frankly that the Social Democratic Center Party (CDS)—the country's most right-wing party—had urged some of its adherents to vote Socialist in this year's election." Melo said that "the entire CDS leadership had been aware of the strategy he's described, and that they had instructed trusted allies—respected figures in Portugal's towns and villages—to urge friends to vote for the Socialist Party or the more moderate Popular Democratic Party instead of the CDS."

How much more moderate the PPD is, we shall see. But one thing becomes clear from this interview. The strategy of the Right was to throw support to the PSP as a means by which to divert attention from its own still considerable strength, and as a means of splitting the Left. Cowan draws the conclusion from what he saw in Portugal that "the Socialist Party is being used as a Trojan Horse for Portugal's right wing—providing a respectable anti-Communist cover for people who oppose programs that the Socialists are pledged to support."

This, believes Cowan, "may have something to do with foreign intervention—with the kinds of activities by the CIA and the Western European Socialist parties that the *New York Times* reported last week. But its roots are also domestic."

THE PPD, which received the second highest percentage of votes, is of even more recent origin than the PSP.

Before the overthrow of the Caetano regime, there was only one legal party in Portugal—the only one permitted legal existence—National Political Action (ANP). It was the electoral arm of the fascist government which in the 1973 elections "won" all 150 seats to the National Assembly.

The PPD was formed in July, 1974, two months after the liberation. Its "moderate" character can be seen in the fact that the honored guest present at this first forming convention was Gen. Antonio de Spinola, the then Provisional President. Also, the leader of the new party, and its subsequently elected head, was Francisco de Sá Carneiro, who under fascism was a leading personality in the National Assembly.

But what gives the PPD its more "moderate" appearance is its attempt to hide its rightist views with left verbiage. Illustrative of this is the kind of program which the PPD adopted. It also calls for socialism. In a pamphlet, *What We Are and What We Are Not*, the PPD explains:

> The PPD is not a conservative and capitalist party and does not favor the social and economic structure in existence prior to April 25.
>
> It is not a party in the service of capitalism, understanding that this must be modified through an anti-monopoly strategy, by increasing the efficient management of the public sector and the alteration of corporate laws.
>
> It is not a Marxist party, although it takes into consideration the contributions of Marxist economic analysis.
>
> It does not consider Marxist experience as the only socialist experience worthy of study and reflection . . .
>
> It therefore rejects the importation of any foreign socialist model, seeing that Social-Democracy has to be constructed in light of Portuguese realities . . .
>
> In sum, it is a *Social Democratic Party* inspired by the principles of socialist humanism like the Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe and in the belief that Portugal has to ad-

vance more and more quickly, in order to transform reality into a free society where social inequality has disappeared.

We have quoted at length from the PPD booklet, in order to give an indication of the social demagogy employed by this party. How much humanism it believes in can be seen by the fact that it was the main political force which, allied with clerical reaction, organized the burning of PCP, trade union and other left centers in many northern cities and towns. How much socialism it believes in can be seen in the fact that its leader, Sá Carneiro, has called for an end to all nationalization and agrarian reform, for a return of many of the properties already under state control, and for the complete dissolution of the MFA.

8. The Communist Party

THE PCP is the only party that conducted an energetic, heroic, never-ceasing struggle against the fascist regime through the entire period of its rule. It was born in 1921, and only five years later was driven underground by the fascist military coup. A tribute to its role and influence in the long struggle against fascism was inadvertently given it by Rep. Edward I. Koch of the 17th Congressional District of New York. Congressman Koch, and a group of colleagues had made an official visit to Portugal in August, 1975. Upon his return, his remarks to Congress were reprinted in the *Congressional Record* of Sept. 18, 1975. Rep. Koch is quoted as saying, "The only political party existing under President Antonio Salazar, and after his death in 1970, [under] President Marcello Caetano, was the Communist Party, . . ."

In passing let us note that Salazar and Caetano were not Presidents but Premiers. But far more important is the Congressman's error in stating that the PCP was the *only* party under fascism. As we have stated above, there was a legal fascist party. But if the Congressman made this error, there is a good reason for this. Everyone in Portugal knows it was the *only* party that functioned throughout the terror to lead an organized mass struggle against the dictatorship, winning for itself great prestige and a mass following.

We had occasion to learn at first hand, from actual participants, how the PCP functioned during the dictatorship. When the first meeting of the Central Committee of the PCP was held after liberation, it was found

that those participating represented 240 years spent in prison and over 700 years of underground activity.

The Portuguese CP had foreseen, long before April 25, 1974, that armed force would be necessary in overthrowing the fascist regime. The Program of its 6th Congress, held in 1965, declares:

> Given the complete absence of liberty and the terrorist policy of the fascist government; given that the fascist state is a strongly centralized state with a military, political and judicial apparatus carefully organized and streamlined; given the determination of governmental circles to offer violent resistance to the end—the only road open to the Portuguese people is to overthrow the fascist dictatorship and bring to power a provisional government, is that of a national uprising, a peoples' armed insurrection, which, due to the militaristic nature of the state, implies the participation and neutralization of an important part of the armed forces.

With this political perspective in mind, the PCP also conducted work inside the armed forces. It did not infiltrate the armed forces; it didn't have to. When its members or followers were drafted for military service, they didn't dodge the draft, or flee the country. They entered the armed forces, maintained their clandestine connections with the Party, and worked to revolutionize the army from within.

Wilfred Burchett interviewed Manual Goedes, a former sailor, and a Party leader who spent 20 years in prison. Goedes joined the navy in 1927 and became a Communist in 1931. Soon Goedes had 40 regular readers of the Party paper. As sailors were required to change ships at least every three years, the men influenced by Goedes and his work were soon spread thoughout the fleet. By the time Goedes was jailed for the first time, in 1933, there were 300 members of the PCP in the navy, and 700 regular readers of the Party press. Goedes was the editor of the Party paper, the *Red Sailor*, and was arrested while visiting the shoreside

printshop of the paper in Lisbon. But the work he started continued without him.

Describing those days, Goedes said:

> Everything was illegal. But Party members could lead normal lives, have legal jobs and do their Party work on the side. Clandestine workers had to cut all relations with parents and families, sometimes wear disguises. They were usually lodged with loyal Party people who did not know their real identity. They received a small salary, enough to keep them alive. This is how the work was directed and continued even in the worst periods of repression. Contact was never lost with those in prison, nor between those who were sent for safety into exile. Only because of the clandestine workers could the Party organization be maintained intact.

The official organ of the Party, the newspaper *Avante*, began to appear a few years after the dictatorship came into being. At first it had tough going to avoid the police and the much hated and bestial internal security organization, PIDE. But in the last 32 years of the dictatorship *Avante* never missed an issue. It was never printed twice in a row in the same clandestine printshop. It constantly moved from place to place, but it circulated all over the country. It came out on onion-skin paper, 8½ by 11 inches in size, with six pages. Each copy circulated until it was no longer readable.

Duarte Machado, a young man who accompanied us on our travels through the country, and acted as our interpreter, guide and educator in Portuguese history, culture, traditions and politics, and who had spent two six month prison terms under the dictatorship, related to us something of the underground methods of distributing *Avante*.

One way was by the organization of "quickie" meetings. These took place wherever working people gathered, particularly in front of factory gates. One person would begin to hawk some merchandise to attract a crowd. As soon as a group gathered, another member

would move swiftly through the crowd slipping a folded copy of the latest *Avante* into each workers' pocket. Another person was on the lookout in case of police surveillance, or any one acting suspiciously. When the papers had been surreptitiously distributed, they moved elsewhere.

Many were arrested, and some frequently. But this, too, was turned to advantage. "Prison was the university," Duarte told us. "Classes were held, problems discussed, cadre trained. There were many non-communist workers, peasants and students who fought back in their own ways and got caught in the meshes of the fascist law. Some of them were not only recruited, but given their future assignments in prison as well as their underground contacts. Such was the Communist underground organization; it functioned in the prisons as well. Communists used to say in jest that Salazar and later, Caetano, were the best recruiters the Party had."

There is one story told of Jose Carlos Almeida, a member of the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party. Almeida had worked in the underground for 12 years before he was arrested on April 21, 1974, exactly four days before the revolutionary overturn. He was shackled and given what was known facetiously as the "scientific treatment." Essentially this was a no-sleep treatment. On April 25, a burly, mean-looking police officer entered the cell. Almeida prepared himself for the beating he was sure was coming. Instead, he was told to get ready to leave—he was free. Even when his cell door was opened and he saw the joyous faces of prisoners as they filed by, he wouldn't believe his eyes. He was certain it was hallucination from lack of sleep.*

In September, 1975, when we were in Portugal, the PCP had over 120,000 members. In May, when its membership was 100,000, a census was taken indicating

*From an article by Arthur Simpson, special correspondent of the *Daily World*, in the *World Magazine*, July 27, 1974

the following composition. Sixty percent of the Party were wage workers of which 12 percent were agricultural laborers, and 20 percent were salaried employees. Thus the Party is an organization primarily composed of working people. The weaknesses in Party composition are shown in that only 15 percent is made up of women and only one percent of farm owners (small peasants). This latter weakness is also reflected in the geographic distribution of Party members, for the Party has scant organization in the countryside of the North, where small farm holdings predominate, and is stronger in the urban industrial centers and among the farm laborers in the South.

The Party's greatest strength is among younger people. Without taking into account the two youth organizations closely associated with it, one of young workers and another of students, the Party's membership is divided into the following age categories: 37 percent is under 30 years of age; 45 percent is between 30 and 50 years, and 18 percent over 50 years.

We were told that the Party's membership could be very much greater than it is, but that the Party sees its role as a vanguard organization which demands considerable time, energy, and readiness to self-sacrifice, on the part of its members. Thus, it is selective in who can become a member. At the same time we were also told that the Party has not yet completely emerged from an underground mentality, and that often Party branches hold up applications for membership without good reason, because they do not think people who were not with the Party in its underground days can be trusted with membership now.

Other forms of sectarianism also manifest themselves. Sometimes this expresses itself in a certain arrogance to new comers in the struggle, as if to say, "What right do you have to challenge our views? Where were you before April 25, 1974?" There is a conscious effort in the Party to combat such tendencies. There is also a struggle

against what is sometimes called "worker sectarianism," that is, a tendency to think that the working class alone, and without class allies, can carry through the revolution. Thus, there is not enough attention given to winning over the small farmers, merchants, professionals and middle strata generally. And, of course, the much smaller percentage of women in the Party is an indication of continuing problems of male supremacist thinking, which make it more difficult to overcome the traditional backward attitude toward women that exists in Portuguese society generally.

9. The Farmers

THE problem of winning over the small farmer who is often poverty stricken, yet conditioned by the petty-bourgeois mentality of the small proprietor, is especially difficult. It is in this stratum that the reaction has made its greatest headway; for it has always been its base. In this respect, as we travelled deep into the North country of small farms, mainly vineyards, we felt that in the various revolutionary slogans put forth, the main one of which called for the unity of the people with the MFA, there was not enough stress on the class alliance needed, particularly or the workers and peasants. The PCP was exceptionally strong among the farm laborers of the southern plains, where it had encouraged the workers to take over the lands of the large estates and therefore carry through agrarian reform *from below.* But this very action in the South had the effect of frightening small farm owners in the North, who feared that agrarian reform would mean the expropriation of their own small farms as well. And, of course, the Bishops and the reactionaries generally, did their best to create and encourage such fears.

Also, as was admitted by Cunhal in a major address to farm laborers in Alentejo, the region where agrarian reform had made its greatest headway, there had been a few overzealous occupations in which small and middle-sized farms were also absorbed into the new farm cooperatives. Cunhal called for a rectification of such errors and respect for the property-rights of the small and middle farmers. He said that the process by which the smaller farmers will enter into cooperative relations

with others will be strictly voluntary, and based on the advantages this form of organization offers. Any pressure or coercion will have just the opposite effect. It will drive the small owner into the arms of reaction and against the revolution. The rights of the small and middle owner to his property and its produce must be strictly respected.

It can readily be understood how only one or two hasty overzealous acts, which try to accomplish by pressure what can only be accomplished over a considerable period of time, can have disastrous consequences in working class-peasant relations and the struggle for agrarian reform and socialism.

We visited a cooperative farm about 50 miles north of Lisbon, near the town of Alpiarca with a population of 16,000. The farm land originally belonged to an Englishman who abandoned the land and returned to England some years back. The takeover by farm workers was aided by the Intersindical trade union organization of the nearby city of Santarem.

There now are 260 persons working the land, growing tomatoes, peppers, pumpkins, cabbages, squash, melon, fruit, figs and grapes. They had also borrowed money from the State bank to buy 50 milk cows. Their plans include the raising of cattle as well.

In meeting with the elected administrative committee, we were told by one of its spokespersons, Antonio Curvacho, a man of about 35 years of age, deeply tanned, with a work cap slanted to one side, and the calloused hands of a worker, that they were only at the early beginnings of the full use of the land. But we are revolutionists, he said, and do not see this in terms of personal enrichment. "We have close relations with the workers in the city. We do not try to get the highest price for our produce. If we did, before long we would be just like the fascists. . . We could have big profits but that is not what we want. City and country must benefit by our efforts."

Curvacho told us that there were only two political

parties with mass support in the area—first the Portuguese Communist Party, and then the MDP—(the Portuguese Democratic Movement allied with the CP).

Asked if he believed the changes in government, with the Portuguese Socialist Party holding the most Cabinet seats, would affect the policy of agrarian reform, he answered: "There is only one socialism. If they try to take the land back, that will show exactly what they are. If they do, we'll fight. I was five-and-one-half years in prison under Salazar and I don't mind risking another five years if it becomes necessary to defend the right to the land."

Our interview could not last long because, as they explained, "in one half hour we are due to help our friends in another place take over the lands of a big owner. This owner has not paid the workers for a whole month. He offered to sell, but wanted them to pay 20,000 escudos a month (about $800). But instead, the workers who are organized are going to take it over and run it themselves as a cooperative."

We were moved and impressed with what we saw and what we heard. There was no doubt in our mind, not after seeing the faces of those meeting with us, that if there is any attempt to take their land from them, they will fight to defend it, and with arms if necessary.

10. The Strange Case of "Republica"

WITH the elections to the Constituent Assembly over, the leaders of the PSP and PPD did exactly what they had agreed not to do. They read into the vote a mandate to take the helm of government into their hands. Not only that, they read into the vote a mandate for putting a brake on the revolution. Referring to this, Cunhal warned, in a speech on June 8, 1975, at Montemor-o-Novo in the heart of the latifundia region—now the area of greatest agrarian reform—that "the revolutionaries will not permit their victories to be challenged by those who obtained their votes by claiming to be for the revolution, but now make references to these same votes to act against the revolution."

He charged the SP leadership with "unhappily maintaining its anti-Communist campaign everywhere," of "trying to create an atmosphere of holy war against the Communists," instead of fighting reaction and its big capitalist and latifundia abettors. And he said that the CP would not organize a counter war against the Socialists. "No, comrades, we do not and will not follow such politics. Our enemies are the reactionaries, the big capitalists and agrarians. It is against these we fight and against them we seek the broadest fraternal unity."

Seeking by any means to break the coalition that had existed, and to oust the 5th Provisional Government headed by Vasco Goncalves, the PSP and PPD soon created the pretexts around which to torpedo the united front. These were over the newspaper *Republica* and the radio station *Renascenca*.

As the PSP and PPD leaderships resigned from the

government over the issues of *Republica* and *Renascenca*, it is necessary to explain what the noise and fury was all about. This is particularly necessary in the United States, where the big conglomerate-owned daily newspapers and TV chains have consciously and deliberately distorted the facts.*

In the *New York Times* of July 13, 1975, there appeared an advertisement of the Social Democrats USA, "An Appeal for Democracy in Portugal." Signed by such persons as A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin and Albert Shanker, the ad said: "Freedom of the press has been brutally suppressed. The Portuguese Socialist Party has been prevented from publishing its paper *Republica* through the connivance of the military security police and the Communist printers acting upon the orders of the Communist Party."

Never were so many misstatements and distortions of fact contained in a single paragraph! First, *Republica* was not and never had been the paper of the Portuguese Socialist Party. The official organ of the PSP is *Portugal Socialista*. *Republica*, a daily Lisbon newspaper, was founded in 1911 as an independent Republican paper. Its director and editor were Raul Rego and Vitor Direito, names that should be remembered for we shall come back to them. *Republica* appeared all through the 48 years of fascist repression and censorship. *After* the overthrow of the fascist regime, the paper's policies swerved in the direction of the Socialist Party. It then began to call itself an independent socialist paper, but it never was the paper of the Portuguese Socialist Party.

What really happened was this. At a time when the PSP and PPD began their attacks upon the leftward course of the government, *Republica* opened a fierce campaign against the MFA and the government of Vasco

*The only daily paper that did not, and which scooped the media in presenting the truth about these issues, is the *Daily World*, the Communist daily which is the only labor and non-capitalist owned daily newspaper in the country.

Goncalves. It was then that the printers on the paper refused to set type, accusing the editors of giving aid to the counterrevolution, and insisted on their right to have a say on editorial policies.

By this time most of the big daily newspapers in Portugal had been nationalized when their owners, the big conglomerates, were taken over by the government. A press law was in effect which divided papers into two kinds: those of mainly a news, informational character, and those which were party organs or mainly of an ideological and political character. No one has a right to censure the latter type papers, and there are dozens of such partisan publications of the most varied type. But in respect to the first type of papers, the so-called independent and informational organs, the workers employed had a right to intervene on editorial policy.

This may be hard to understand in a country in which many believe that the existence of two newspaper chains in a city like Chicago represents real freedom of the press. For people who believe this, the right of a capitalist publisher to print what he pleases, just because he has the millions to do so, is sacrosanct, but the right of the men and women who produce the paper, and do not have the means to print one of their own, is nonexistent. But this is not how the workers on *Republica* felt about it.

The facts are that the Communists did not order or otherwise encourage the workers to demand a right in editorial policy. Of the 194 printers at *Republica*, there were only a handful of PCP members, and on the elected shop committee of 30 there were only two Communists. The PCP members did not initiate the action, although the decision of the shop committee was subsequently upheld by the entire shop crew.

When Rego and Direito refused the demand of the workers to have a say on editorial policy, they refused to set type. As a consequence, the owner shut down the plant.

Mario Soares, calling *Republica* "the last voice of freedom," asked the MFA to close down the paper and to dismiss the "Communist" printers. He said that it was necessary to "take the paper away from Cunhal."

On June 20, a military security unit turned the paper back to its owners. But Raul Rego, a close associate of Spinola and Information Minister under him, handed the MFA officer a list of demands: the right to fire all "dissident" workers; the right to choose a new composing room foreman; and the barring of all workers' attempts at expressing their views on editorial policy.

Major Dias Fereira, head of the military unit, refused to accept an ultimatum from anyone. Rego then charged the government with violating the Press Law. The case was finally adjudicated legally, with the workers ordered to end their action and the publisher ordered not to dismiss the workers. This not being to the liking of Reno, the paper was abandoned to the workers.

In an interview with Carlos Aboim Inglez, a top national leader of the PCP, I discussed the matter of *Republica* and *Renascenca.* It seemed to me, I said, these two incidents which occurred approximately at the same time were provocations meant to create pretexts for the resignation of the PSP and PPD from the government, and for inflaming religious feelings and antagonism toward the Portuguese Communist Party. If this is so, I asked, did the PCP make clear enough that it bore no responsibility for the takeovers? Aboim Inglez answered that I was right; these were pretexts provoked to create a crisis, and the Party tried to make this clear. But it faced a problem: This was an action of the workers and there was a principle involved—the right of workers to have a say in policy, the right of workers to control management. The Party will not take an unprincipled stand; it will not oppose this right of the workers.

Recently, the truth about the *Republica* and *Renascenca* takeovers has appeared in some of the liberal pub-

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lications. In the *Nation* of October 4, 1975, Bert Cochran wrote as follows:

> The two institutional seizures that were used by western publications to demonstrate the totalitarian proclivities of the Communists—that of *Republica*, the Socialist-inclined daily, and *Radio Renascenca*, the Catholic Church station—were not the doing of the Communist Party at all. The staffs of both institutions were dominated by a variety of leftists, most of whom had no attachments to the Communists.

This same article also had something to say about freedom of the press in Portugal. Cochran called Lisbon the freest city in the world, with "free speech, free press and free assembly practiced with zeal." Lisbon with less than one-eighth the population of New York City has three times as many dailies.

The duplicity involved in the charge of the PSP that *Republica* was "the last voice of freedom," can be seen in a simple fact. Senhors Rego and Direito, who directed and edited *Republica* have not lost their voice. They now put out another daily newspaper *A Luta*, which calls itself a "socialist, pluralist and independent journal." Which only means that if one is rich enough to do so, he or she can still publish a daily newspaper in Lisbon, especially if one can find workers who will go along with management.

The right of the super-rich to publish daily newspapers whenever they want, is not exactly the definition of freedom of the press as we understand it. But it does answer the lies of Mario Soares and his American defenders.

11. "Renascenca" and the Church

THE take-over of *Radio Renascenca* by its workers became a highly emotional issue. Unlike the case of the newspaper *Republica*, which was not owned by the Socialist Party, the radio station was the property of the Catholic Church. It was easier to distort the issue, therefore, into one of an anti-religious assault on the church.

Portugal is a Catholic country. While there had been a separation of Church and State, this was purely formal. In reality, the relationships had been close and intimate. The dictator Salazar was a religious fanatic, and in rural areas, particularly in the North, church and state authority were often vested in the diocese Bishop and local priest, whose words were taken to be those of both God and Salazar.

When it served its purposes, the Church used religion as a political weapon. In 1917, confronted by a movement to divide church lands in favor of landless peasants, the Church exploited the "Miracle of Fatima" to drown this attempt in religious hysteria. It seems that in the hamlet of Fatima, near Leira, shepherd boys had reported seeing apparitions of the Virgin Mary. The site was turned into a great religious shrine and tens of thousands of pilgrims come yearly in hope of new miracles.

The overthrow of the dictatorship on April 25, 1974, confronted Church leaders with a new political situation. Knowing their own complicity with the fascist regime, they muffled their political feelings and went along with the new changes for a while. But as the class struggle sharpened and the Socialist Party shifted to an openly

anticommunist position, the church hierarchy felt it safe to return to old ways. It was then that a sharp collision over policy developed between the owners of *Radio Renascenca* and the workers and staff employed by it. The station was being used to broadcast reactionary diatribes against the revolution and the government of Vasco Goncalves, and this infuriated the station's employees.

When the station was taken over by the workers this became the *cause celebre* for launching a holy crusade against the Communist Party, which was accused of being responsible for the act. A massive campaign of incitation to violence followed, in which the Bishops and priests worked closely with the rightest political leaders of the Social Democratic Center (CDS) and the Popular Democratic Party (PPD). More than 40 headquarters of the PCP and of trade union and smaller Left parties were razed to the ground.

After the burning of the PCP headquarters in Aveiro, the Bishop of that diocese who is also the President of the Episcopal Conference, called for like actions everywhere. "The example of Aveiro," he said, "must be repeated in the North, in the South, all over." This example was repeated in the Dioceses of Viseu, Braganca, Coimbra and Lomego.

The demonstrations which provided the cover for these incendiary acts were usually organized in the same way. They were called anonymously but announced from the pulpits by the priests. They concentrated on the rural population by leading many peasants to believe that not only were their small plots being threatened by the revolution, but also their religion. And they were brought by fleets of rented buses to the Episcopal cities where the demonstrations took place. The Bishops participated in the actions and one of the central demands was for the return of *Renascenca* "stolen by the Communists."

We asked Domingo Lopes of the Portuguese Communist Party about *Renascenca*. He said that the Party

had nothing at all to do with the take-over, and that it [the take-over] had played into the hands of reaction. But there was an issue of principle involved. Does the Church as a religious institution have the right to engage in politics and to use its properties for that purpose? If it does, what happens to the Church as a religious institution established to serve the spiritual needs of all believers, regardless of their political views? What happens to the separation of Church and State?

Bishops and priests, he said, have a right to participate in politics like all other citizens. They can join political parties, run for political office, or even form their own party or parties. But this is different from using the Church as an institution and its properties, for political ends. *Radio Renascenca* had the right to use publicly-assigned radio wave lengths to broadcast religious services or to discuss religious themes and Church matters. But it had no right to engage in politics, just as priests had no right to use their pulpits to incite acts of political violence. And conversely, he said, political parties must respect religious beliefs and refrain from interfering in religious services and internal church affairs.

This, he believed, was the more fundamental issue raised by the *Renascenca* controversy.

THE TEMPER of the ideological anticommunist campaign launched by the Church hierarchy can be seen by the words of don Francisco da Silva, Bishop of Braga, at a demonstration in his diocese:

> The Portuguese problem is this and this only: on one side the minority, against the will of the people, imposing communism on the nation, where there is no place for an independent country or religion. On the other side an overwhelming majority that says "no" to communism. . . . What is being contested, yes, I repeat it, is only and simply the liberty of our country, the freedom to practice religion, the essential right of the human being. . . . The hour has come to say "no." We must

wake up . . . The Christian people must assume their responsibility, with the certainty that there are values greater than their own lives—God, Church, Country.

The response of the PCP was sober and to the point. Alvaro Cunhal said:

> We think the Portuguese Church has had a historic opportunity after April 25, 1974, to erase some of its sins. During fascism, the Church closely collaborated with fascism and it has supported the politics of those times through its various organs. However, after April 25, 1974, the Communists did not utilize this as a reproach or accusation against the Church. We have made a great effort so that the Church could adapt itself and find the path by which to wash away its past sins.*

As for the burnings themselves, these did not intimidate the PCP and its members. They knew they were the acts of a relative handful, without the approval and understanding of most of those who participated in the demonstrations. Domingo Lopes, told us, "It doesn't take many people to start a fire. If we wanted to use the same tactics, then you'd really see fires. But this is not our way of fighting. We depend on the people."

*The facts and quotations relating to the demonstrations and burnings of headquarters in northern and central Portugal, come from the group, Portuguese Christians for Socialism. This was relayed to American Christians Toward Socialism (ACTS) via the Centre Oecuminque de Liasons Internationales, Paris, France.

12. Left and Psuedo-Left Formations

THE first thing we learned upon our arrival in Lisbon was that there were more parties and political groups than we had ever thought possible. Our bus trip from the airport to the hotel was sufficient to show this. Screeching from every wall, statue, overpass, fence, and from many sidewalks, were posters and slogans printed or painted in garish colors. Many urged attendance at a *comicio*, a rally. Others screamed political messages. They were signed by strange combinations of letters, as if picked from an alphabet grab bag: PCP, PSP, PPD, MFA, CDS, PPM, UDP, MDP/CDE, MES, FSP, LCI, LUAR, PRP-BR, MRPP, PCP-ML, CRM, and many others.

With the exception of a few, such as the Popular Monarchist Party (PPM), the Social Democratic Center (CDS), and the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), the great majority claimed to be Left and revolutionary. When we became more fully involved in the intense political life, the constant discussions and debates, it became clear that we were witnessing a scene in which nearly anyone marching down the street with a red flag could pick up a few followers.

When one spoke to the members of these small groups they all claimed to have mass influence. Of the six that were on the April 1975 ballot for Constituent Assembly, however, one of them, the Portuguese Democratic Movement—closely allied with the Portuguese Communist Party—received five percent of the votes, while the other five groups combined got less than two percent of the vote.

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Yet it is inaccurate to judge these groups by their votes alone. Composed largely of young people, many of them students, they are constantly on the go—putting up posters, turning out leaflets, or trying to seize the initiative on one issue or another. Sometimes they succeed, whether for better or for worse. The evidence that they exist far exceeds the organized following that they have.

The Left and psuedo-Left groups and grouplets are in sharp competition with each other and particularly with the PCP, which everyone admits has great strength in the working class and general influence and prestige. When a member of one of these groups is asked to explain what separates it from the others, the answer is usually vague, the main point being the claim that it is the only truly revolutionary organization.

An ideological characteristic of most of these groups is the influence of anarchistic ideas and romanticism. This is not strange in a country where anarchism has had strong roots in peasant individualism, tiny production units, brutal ruling class repression, and a close intermixture of peasantry, workers and petty bourgeoisie.

Despite sharp ideological and political differences between the groups, and between them and the PCP, there has also developed a degree of unity in action. A *Frente Unidade Revolucionaria* (FUR) has been formed composed of six organizations—the Popular Socialist Front (FSP), Movement of Left Socialists (MES), Unified League of Revolutionary Activists (LUAR), International Commmunist League (LCI), Party of the Proletarian Revolution-Revolutionary Brigades (PRP-BR), and the Portuguese Democratic Movement now united with the Democratic Electoral Center (MDP/CDE).

FUR calls for a unified fight against fascism, imperialism and capitalism. It favors a revolutionary government composed exclusively of representatives from "autonomous organizations of popular power." This refers to commissions elected by the people at their base,

everywhere, in shops, offices, army barracks, neighborhoods, villages, etc., and their unification and coordination through delegated popular assemblies.

The PCP strongly favors and helps initiate the formation of commissions and assemblies representing the people at their base. It differs with FUR in that it believes that a revolutionary government should also have direct representation from political parties. It is for ousting the Popular Democratic Party from the government because it is a party of the Right, but it is for the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the armed forces movement and other Left groupings being represented in the government.

For a short period the PCP was part of the FUR formation despite some differences with it. But it is no longer in FUR, although it works with it on many questions and the Portuguese Democratic Movement which is closely allied with it is an integral part of FUR. The Communist Party is strongly in favor of Left unity but says that it cannot become part of a structure in which it has the responsibility of bringing the masses while a combination of smaller groups and grouplets has the power to determine policy.

Thus, there is a degree of Left unity, even within a framework of sharp ideological and political dispute. When it comes to action against the threat of a fascist coup, or of government retreat from a revolutionary course, they tend to stand and act together.

TWO EXCEPTIONS to this are the Maoist organizations—the Movement for the Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat (MRPP) and the Portuguese Communist Party-Marxist Leninist (PCP-ML). These two groups have a position quite different from that of the Left generally; one which places them more and more on the other side of the struggle.

In travelling through North Portugal, where reaction is still strong, we saw posters and slogans of both the

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MRPP and the PCP-ML. Some of them read: *Nem Kissinger Nem Brezhnev*—neither Kissinger nor Brezhnev. Thus, at a time when the United States is doing all in its power short of direct military intervention to halt and reverse the Portuguese revolution, these Maoist groups place the Soviet Union in a similar relationship to that of U.S. imperialism. But the Soviet Union has no multinational corporations and no investments in Portugal or its former colonies. It has no military bases on the Azores or other Portuguese territories, and it seeks none. To make it appear that the Soviet Union also represents a threat to Portugal is a shameful distortion of the truth.

But the two Maoist organizations go even further than this. While linking the Soviet Union with the United States, they actually see the Soviet Union as the enemy, not U.S. imperialism. And within the country, it is not fascism that is being fought, but the Portuguese Communist Party, which they label, "social fascist."

The MRPP states, "from the national point of view, social fascism is the principle enemy." It is from this so-called "analysis" that both the MRPP and the PCP-ML have allied themselves with the Portuguese Socialist Party, which in turn is allied with the rightist Popular Democratic Party, both of them receiving the blessing and the aid of U.S. imperialism.

José Costa, head of the Department of External Relations of the PCP-ML, spelled out the Maoist position:

> The Socialist Party, which is not a socialist party, will defend Portugal against superpower imperialism. The Socialist Party is a party which seeks to establish a Western European style of Social Democracy. We know this. But, as we realize that Portugal is a Western European nation that wants to remain independent, we think that the Socialist Party is one of the forces with which we must work. Although it is a bourgeois party it is the only party that will defend democratic liberties. . . .
>
> We cannot think of a revolution now. We must create a condition favorable to revolution, but we do not have such a

> situation yet. . . . We know that one day we must break with the Socialist Party and attack it; but for the moment we think it is a good alliance to make against the principle problem, which is imperialist forces of any kind, and first in this are the forces represented by the Portuguese Communist Party.

Need any more be said? If there ever was hypocritical double talk to conceal a flagrant betrayal of revolution, it is this. The Socialist Party is a "bourgeois party," but an alliance with it is "good," because the "principle problem" is the PCP. And in the midst of a revolution in which one side or the other must win, the Maoists say, "We cannot think of revolution now," because "We must create a condition favorable to revolution." What is that condition, according to them?—the defeat of the Portuguese Communist Party!

The alliance between the Maoists and the Portuguese Socialist Party is a fact. In one trade union election after another they put forth a common slate. And in the very midst of the burning and looting of Communist headquarters in the North, MRPP *comicios* were permitted to take place. When we stopped at Ponte da Barca, the northern-most point of our journey—about ten miles below the Spanish border—we saw posters on walls advertising a rally of the MRPP that had been held on August 15, at a time when terror reigned against the Communists and other Left organizations. Apparently the Right knows it has nothing to fear from so-called "leftists" who make the Soviet Union and the Portuguese Communist Party the targets of their attack.

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13. Communist Differences

IN the independent pro-Socialist Party newspaper *A Luta*, on September 17, 1975, there appeared a box on the front page with the head, "Anti-Fascist Unity is Needed in Portugal, declares Berlinguer in the festival of *Unita*." Enrico Berlinguer is the leader of the Italian Communist Party and *Unita* is its daily newspaper.

What was this all about, and why did the newspaper directed and edited by Raul Rego and Vitor Direito, formerly of *Republica*, find it important to run a story about what the Italian Communist leader had said at a festival in Florence, Italy?

It is widely known that differences have arisen between the Portuguese Party and the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties over the situation in Portugal and the correct tactics to be pursued. The Spanish and Italian parties have held that the Portuguese Party is driving too hard and should have been more flexible in its relations, especially with the Socialist Party. On the question of a single labor federation, for example, they have felt that the Party should have used its influence within the trade union movement to permit the formation of different federations along ideological lines, such as have existed in Italy since the split in the labor movement shortly following World War I.

In the story carried in *A Luta*, Berlinguer is quoted as saying that there was a time in the early '30s when sectarian policies predominated in Communist ranks resulting in grave damage to the democratic struggle. This reflected itself in a tendency to put the fascists and the social democrats in one bag. The 7th World Congress of

the Communist International, held in 1935, criticized and changed this narrow position, and without hiding the differences between the Communists, the socialists and the social democrats, traced a line of cooperation and unity between them as the precondition for the victory over fascism.

According to the *A Luta* dispatch, Berlinguer went on to deal with the Portuguese situation and called for the unity of all anti-fascists as indispensable, no matter how difficult it was to attain this, if the country was to pass through its present crisis and the threat of a reactionary regression.

A Luta went on to say that about a million people participated in the festival and that the editor of the Portuguese Socialist Party's organ, *Portugal Socialista*, Sottomayor Cardia, was also present and held a private interview with Berlinguer.

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THE PURPOSE of this story in *A Luta* is obvious. It aimed to use the Communist Party of Italy against the Portuguese Communist Party. And while Berlinguer made no direct criticism of the PCP, the inference left by his remarks was that the PCP was responsible for the split between the Portuguese Communists and the Socialist Party leadership.

Berlinguer, according to *A Luta*, referred favorably to the 7th World Congress of the Communist International which worked out the tactical line for the world struggle against fascism and the threat of world war. But we are certain that the Portuguese Communists know full well the importance of unity in the fight against fascism. They lived under the fascist yoke, and fought against it heroically, for 48 years. Certainly they do not want fascism to return; they would be its first victims.

But the tactics worked out by the 7th World Congress are not to be applied mechanically or defensively, as if bourgeois democracy is the end goal of the struggle. The situation today is quite different from that in 1935 when

fascism was sweeping the earth. Today, it is not enough to defend bourgeois democracy from fascism, but to pursue a line of policies that brings about a socialist transformation of society. Especially in Portugal, where the fascist regime has been overthrown, and where the revolutionary spirit of the people is high and where everyone—at least in words—admits that socialism is the goal of the revolution, it would be taking a backward step to merely aim for a bourgeois democracy of the social democratic type. In Portugal, due to its history, economy, its dependence upon the great imperialist powers and its balance of trade problems, a bourgeois democracy such as exists in other Western European countries is untenable for any period of time. The bourgeoisie does not have the wherewithal to make concessions to a large enough layer of the population so as to establish even a modicum of consensus rule. In Portugal the sharpness of the class struggle demands that the country go either to the Left, to socialism, or it will be driven back to the Right, to fascism.

This is the basic analysis of the Portuguese Communist Party which determines its so-called "hard" line. It has fought for Socialist-Communist unity. It has asked repeatedly for consultations with the Portuguese Socialist Party to work out a common program and strategy for the struggle. But it will not agree to a policy of retreat; it will not agree to a bourgeois social democratic perspective for the revolution, for this means the death of the revolution and the return of fascism.

Of course, it is understandable that the rapidity of developments in Portugal has created some temporary problems for the Communist Parties of Italy and Spain. In both countries the Communists are working for the very broadest unity in order to move the country forward. In Spain, the objective is a broad front of antifascist unity that can bring into being a democratic government and put an end to the nightmare of fascism that the Spanish people have lived under for nearly four de-

cades. It is understandable, also, that the sharpness of the class struggle in Portugal, since the fascist overthrow, frightens certain liberal elements in Spain from moving more decisively against the fascist regime. But this is no reason why the Portuguese masses should be asked to hold back their struggle.

Likewise in Italy, where the Communists want to break through the barriers erected against their participation in government, one can understand why the events in Portugal are disquieting to some socialists and Christian Democrats. But in Portugal the situation is different. Should they halt, or retreat, because they have overnight gone beyond the Italian or Spanish developments?

When I met with Carlos Aboim Inglez of the PCP leadership, I asked him whether stories such as that in *A Luta*, and the general use of these differences by enemies of the Party in Portugal, had created problems within the Party. No, he said, the Party is solidly united around its general line and policies. He did admit, however, that the Italian and Spanish Parties positions had caused vacillation and confusion among sympathizers of the Party and thus hurt the struggle. "It is a strange kind of proletarian internationalism," he said, "when the Communist Parties of some countries will permit themselves to be used against the interests of the revolution in another country." He expressed his Party's gratitude to the Communist Party of the United States for its solidarity and support.

In a TV interview with the leaders of the main parties after the election results were announced on the night of April 25, 1975, Cunhal responded to a question put to him with these words:

> We have our own revolution. A revolutionist is one who finds new solutions in line with the reality of the situation. Our situation has always been unique as compared to that of other Communist parties. We defended the idea of using violence in

overthrowing the fascist regime in our country when other Communist parties in Europe were defending nonviolent methods. We're not criticizing them. They have their own problems to solve in their own way.

The situation in Portugal is very unique and the Communist Party has to find its own solution for concrete problems in a revolutionary and not a bureaucratic way.

. . . What we say to our Italian comrades is, "O.K., you have your problems, solve them your way. We have our problems, we will solve them our way." We expected to find a wider understanding of our problems. But we cannot permit any outside forces to influence our solutions.

14. Portugal and the USA

NO sooner did the news of the fascist overthrow reach this country than great concern began to be expressed by the State Department and the monopoly-controlled news media about the future of democracy in Portugal. For 48 long years of brutal dictatorship nothing was said about the massive repression, few news stories appeared in the press, no editorials were written, and no protests lodged. Fascist Portugal was considered part of the "free world," a member of NATO, a "worthy ally" to receive military and economic aid from the United States.

The belated concern with democracy in Portugal has nothing to do with freedom for its people. It has everything to do with freedom for U.S. investments in Portugal and its colonial empire. It also has to do with the fear that revolution in Portugal could become contagious, spreading to other countries in Western Europe.

Multinational corporations controlled fully one-third of Portugal's economy, and another third was controlled by firms financially tied to them. More than 800 foreign firms operated in Portugal, with West German corporations taking first, and those of the United States, second place.

Even more important than Portugal itself were the Portuguese colonies. Independence for Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola would endanger multinational investments in these countries and in all of Africa. Angola, twice the size of Texas, is one of the richest lands in the world in natural resources. A revolutionary Angola on the West Coast of South Africa, and a revolutionary

Mozambique on the East Coast, would have a revolutionizing effect on the entire continent.

Thus, what happened in Portugal was of great concern to the U.S. ruling class. As soon as it became clear that the revolution was taking on a democratic people's character, U.S. corporations began their work of sabotage.

The Dow Chemical Company broke off negotiations about the installation of a $100 million ethylene refinery when the government demanded a 50 percent state partnership. Exxon and Mobil Oil broke off negotiations for the construction of petrochemical works. Allied Magnetus closed its doors when its workers asked for a raise. The ITT cancelled investments and also shipment on a number of export orders to Portugal. The World Bank, controlled by the United States, refused the Portuguese government credits which had been agreed to before the liberation. And other foreign firms shut down when the minimum wage law went into effect. In this way, economic pressure upon the new government began.

According to Philip Agee, a former CIA agent in Latin America, and author of the best seller book *Inside the Company: A CIA Diary*, there are 280 persons attached to the U.S. Government Mission in Portugal, not counting undercover CIA and Pentagon operatives. Agee who visited Portugal twice since liberation, addressed an open letter to the Portuguese people. The size of the U.S. Mission, he wrote, "is shocking," especially in the heavy dominance of military personnel. Of the 280 persons there are 105 military men.

The first priority of the CIA, Agee wrote, is to penetrate the MFA. This is done by spreading rumors, fomenting strife and encouraging conflict and jealousy. The objective is to get MFA "moderates" in control of all Portuguese military installations:

U.S. military schools have trained over 3,000 Portuguese

military personnel since 1950. Detailed files have been accumulated on every one of them—their personalities, politics, likes and dislikes, strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. . . .

Significant efforts have already been made . . . to strengthen Social Democratic and Christian Democratic political parties. The CIA's normal procedure is to maintain friendly relations (and often to give financial support) to leaders of "moderate" opposition political parties who are forced to live in exile. Often paid agents are infiltrated into these groups . . .

At the end of his letter, Agee lists the names of CIA people "known to me and those whom I believe to be CIA personnel," and the specific departments to which they are attached in Portugal.

Agee referred to news stories about so-called Soviet shipments of millions of dollars to the Portuguese Communist Party as typical State Department plants to prepare the American people for "another secret foreign adventure by the CIA."

AFTER the failure of the September 28, 1974, rightist plot, the State Department removed Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott from Portugal and replaced him with Frank C. Carlucci, a special agent on secret warfare. Carlucci served in Brazil from 1965 to 1968. He is presumed to be the man in charge of coordinating all secret, clandestine operations in Portugal.

United States government plotting does not end there. The CIA is working closely with two Portuguese counterrevolutionary nests operating in Brazil and Spain. Fascist Brazil has become a center for reactionary emigres from Portugal. Former dictator Caetano is a Professor of Law at a private university in Sao Paulo. Admiral Americo Thomaz, former President of Portugal under the fascist regime, is also in Sao Paulo. So are General Spinola and the other generals who fled Portugal after the collapse of their coup attempts. A number

of Portugal's richest industrial and banking tycoons have also fled to Brazil.

Nor is it accidental that the Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal is Gen. Albert da Fontana, former head of Brazil's National Intelligence Agency. As cultural and economic ties have always been close between Portugal and Brazil, the Brazilian dictatorship is fearful of revolutionary repercussions from Portugal. Thus Brazil is a so-called "natural" place for the plotting against Portuguese democracy.

The counterrevolutionary nest in Spain has a more concrete logistics role. Bordering Portugal on its two land sides, with much of this mountainous terrain, Spain is seen as the logical place from which an armed coup could be undertaken. It has already been reported that large arms shipments are being smuggled into Northern Portugal and that a rightest "army of liberation" is being trained. How much of this is rumor and how much fact is hard to judge. One thing is clear. The fascist regime in Spain has a stake in preventing the Portuguese revolution from succeeding. It is ready to do all it can to help those who want to restore fascist rule.

Thus, when Gen. Vasco Goncalves was forced out of premiership and an extended governmental crisis ensued, Spinola flew from Brazil to Spain, and then from there to Paris, France. But when the situation in Lisbon settled down somewhat, and the moment was not propitious for another attempt at a military coup. Spinola returned to Brazil.

THE STRATEGY of U.S. imperialism's Operation Portugal is, hence, clear. First, it aims to give continued massive assistance to the Portuguese Socialist Party in an endeavor to split the revolutionary front and to isolate the Portuguese Communist Party and the Left generally. Second, it uses U.S. and other foreign corporations in Portugal to create as much economic chaos as possible, and to dangle the carrot of financial aid if the govern-

ment agrees to move to the Right. Third, the CIA is working to win over or neutralize officers of the MFA by whatever means are necessary so as to destroy it as the effective armed sentinel of the revolution. And finally, through these means to prepare the way for a successful fascist military take-over. Nothing short of this will do. Nationalizations and agrarian reform have gone too far, the class struggle too far advanced. The only answer, therefore, is fascist rule.

This is why one of the most popular slogans in Portugal is: "Portugal Will Not Be the Chile of Europe!" But if it is not to be depends not only on the people of Portugal but also on how the people of the United States make clear to their government that every form of intervention in Portugal must cease.

It is in the interest of the American people, especially its working people, that the Portuguese revolution is successful. Over recent years we have learned from bitter experience how U.S. multinational corporations, seeking ever more sources of cheap labor abroad, take jobs away from American workers and undermine our wage and living standards. In the name of so-called "foreign competition," U.S. corporations say such lowered living conditions are necessary if they are to "compete successfully" with foreign firms. What they hide from public view, however, is that many of these foreign companies are only overseas subsidiaries of the same multinational corporations. Hence, when countries abroad nationalize U.S. holdings, it is in the interest of American workers. It enables these peoples to raise wages, improve living conditions, and thus put an end to being a "cheap labor" source.

There is another even more important reason why the American people should do all they can to prevent U.S. intervention in Portuguese affairs, whether open or concealed, whether by means of money or arms. The seemingly endless war in Indochina which lasted for over a decade and resulted in wholesale death and destruction

should teach us a lesson. People who want revolutionary change are not going to desist because Exxon, ITT and the other giant corporations don't happen to like it. Any interference in other peoples' affairs only heightens the danger of a military involvement. In Portugal this would be doubly hazardous. An attempt at a reactionary military coup could lead to a protracted civil war which could endanger the peace of Europe and the world.

The people of Portugal must be permitted to decide for themselves which course their nation should take. It is in their deepest self-interest that U.S. workers should demand *Hands off Portugal!*

15. Angola

ONE of the main concerns of the U.S. government and the CIA with Portuguese developments is related to the future of the former colonies. Portugal itself is considered of great strategic importance from the viewpoint of maintaining Western Europe as a solid front against socialism. But the former Portuguese colonies tempt U.S. imperialism because of their immense natural and agricultural riches and because of their relationship to the whole African continent.

Already in 1962, according to an article in the *New York Times* of September 25, 1975, the U.S. government began to consider how it could take over the Portuguese colonial empire. As the guerrilla war against Portugal had already become intense, Washington sought a way to turn this to its own advantage. Its first, although not only, interest was in Angola. This is a vast country, twice the size of Texas, with immense natural riches, including oil, diamonds, iron ore, gold, copper, manganese and sulpher.

When France was compelled to withdraw from Indochina, the United States moved in. A similar racist, imperialist development is taking place in Angola. The CIA chose a man by the name of Holden Roberto, the brother-in-law of General James Mobutu of Zaire (formerly the Congo), as "a future leader of Angola." For seven years, from 1962 to 1969, the CIA supplied Roberto with money and arms but, according to the *New York Times* account, "to no avail." Roberto was then "deactivated" and placed on "retainer."

When the fascist regime in Portugal was overthrown,

it soon became clear that independence for the colonies could not be avoided. Roberto was then taken off of ice and "reactiviated." His specific job is to foment tribal strife and civil war in order to prevent the unification of the country under the leadership of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), headed by Dr. Agostinho Neto, a Marxist.

In addition to using Roberto and his National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the CIA has also given financial and military aid to a group known as UNITA, involved in military operations against the MPLA on Angola's eastern flank.

It is generally acknowledged that the MPLA represents the great majority of Angolans. It has helped to organize the people into a powerful movement, has formed peoples' militias, created democratic local forms of rule, and holds effective control of Luanda, the capital, and ten of the country's 16 provinces.

Roberto's FNLA operates in the North, close to the Zaire border, and uses Zaire as its supply and training base and as refuge in case of retreat. At stake in the civil war in the North is the extremely rich oil region, Cabinda, which borders Zaire and is cut off from the rest of Angola by the Congo River and a Zaire corridor to the sea. It is here that the Gulf Oil Company and other multinational corporations have important investments.

The appeal of the FNLA is primarily to the Bakongo tribal group of which Roberto is a member. It uses tribalism as a major ideological and emotional weapon. If it fails to prevent the MPLA from assuming the nation's leadership, as seems more or less certain, its aim is to tear away the northern provinces in a secessionist movement and to create conditions for a long drawn out civil war.

The U.S. government has been frantically rushing military and financial aid to Roberto. One of the most dangerous of recent developments is the employment of South African mercenary troops against the Angolan lib-

eration armies. The racist government of South Africa seeks to prevent a truly revolutionary government from gaining power in Angola, which is geographically separated from South Africa only by Namibia (South-West Africa), administered by the Republic of South Africa.

A victory of the liberation forces in Angola is also feared by Zaire, where the memory of the martyred Patrice Lumumba is still alive. Both South Africa and Zaire work closely with the United States and other western imperialist states to prevent true independence for Angola. At this time of writing, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, has made an impassioned plea to Congress to rush $60 million additional "aid" to Zaire. This is part payment for Zaire's role in the Angolan strife.

Another shameful aspect of this situation is the role of the Peking government. Overwhelming evidence indicates that the Chinese government has also been giving military aid to the FNLA. It is reported that about 200 Chinese military advisers, operating from bases in Zaire, have been training FNLA troops in guerrilla warfare.

Thus China and U.S. imperialism find themselves on the same side in the Angolan fighting, on the side of those who wish to turn Angola into a neo-colony of imperialism. Whatever may be the tortured rationale of the Chinese leaders, their intervention on the side of the FNLA cannot but help prolong a Biafra-type secessionist war aimed at carving up Angola in the interests of U.S. and Western European imperialist powers.

While Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau have already won their independence, it should not be taken for granted that U.S. imperialism and the CIA will accept this verdict as final. It is necessary to be on guard for racist imperialist attempts to stir up tribal and civil strife in those former colonies as well. Both of them are also rich in natural resources and Mozambique is a country as large as Texas.

It is therefore necessary that the American people demand of their government a cessation of all shipments

of arms and money to those who seek to prevent the real independence of Portugal's former colonies. The Black people of Africa have the right to rule themselves free of imperialist intrigue, exploitation and oppression. It is particularly important to stop the war in Angola, where Black Africans are being used to kill Black Africans. The MPLA should be recognized as the legitimate government of Angola.

16. Where is Portugal Going?

AS these lines are being written, it is not possible to say what the outcome of the revolutionary crisis in Portugal will be. Will the revolution move forward and achieve its democratic and socialist objectives? Or will it be pushed back and defeated, to restore fascism to power again? These are the alternatives. This is what the fight is all about.

There are those who hope for an "easy" way out. They hope that by some still unknown compromises the ecstatic euphoria of the first days of the revolution will be restored. Then everyone will march together again, like one great happy family.

But such hopes are surely to be disappointed. Even were the revolutionary forces ready to accept some kind of bourgeois-social-democratic "solution"—which they are not—it would only be an extremely short-lived chimera. It could not contain the sharpness of class struggle, which would only push matters to extremes again. Not only has this been the history of Portugal up to now, but with major sectors of industry nationalized, with tens of thousands of acres of the best lands of the huge estates turned over to peasant-run agrarian cooperatives, there is hardly a chance that the big bourgeoisie and landowners will quietly acquiesce to the loss of their properties and their ability to dominate the Portuguese economy.

And conversely, it is hard to believe that the workers who now run their own plants, or the agrarian laborers who run their farm cooperatives, are going to permit

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former owners to take possession again. This was made ample clear to us. They will fight to hold on to these.

This does not mean that some compromises may not be necessary. We heard Alvaro Cunhal speak to a huge rally in Lisbon's bull-fight arena, where he said that pauses may be necessary at times, or a retracing of steps, or even a correction of mistakes, but not a turning back on the essential course of the revolution. That is inviolate; that will be defended come what may.

AT THE moment, the Sixth Provisional Government of Pinheiro de Azevedo finds itself at an impasse. Its declared program is for a defense of the gains of the revolution and for a continuation of its course toward the socialist goal. But the composition of the cabinet is such as to belie either the will or the ability of the government to carry out its agreed program.

The main reason for this is the inclusion of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) in the government and the assignment of three ministerial posts to it. Speaking of this to the mass rally in Lisbon, Cunhal asked rhetorically: How is it possible for representatives of the PPD in the government to defend the conquests of the revolution, when through the mouth of its leader Sá Carniero it challenges the democratic liberties won since the revolution, as well as decolonization, nationalization and agrarian reform? How can a party which has threatened to arm a militia of 50,000 men, declare itself as opposed to subversion and guerrilla war?

One factor in the inclusion of the PPD in the government was the insistence of the Socialists that they would not participate in a government without the PPD. Yet even if the Socialist Party was concerned with a government representing a numerical majority of the votes cast in the April 25, 1975, election for Constituent Assembly, such a majority was possible without the PPD. The 38 percent obtained by the Socialist Party, the 12.5 percent of the Communists the 5 percent won by the Por-

tuguese Democratic Movement (MDP), and the 2 percent obtained by the other smaller Left groupings, would have represented a total considerably above the 50 percent mark.

At any rate, the government of Azevedo, as of this moment, is incapable of moving forward or backward. A number of attempts have been made to move backward, but each of these was checkmated by a powerful, aroused peoples' movement.

Tremendously important in this connection are the developments inside the armed forces. It should be recalled that the MFA has always been an officer movement, not one stemming directly from the rank and file soldiers. The ranks supported the MFA because they wanted an end to the war and because they favored a revolutionary course. But as differences began to develop within the MFA itself, as vacillation and wavering began to assert themselves, the rank and file of the armed forces began to enter more fully into the political struggle on their own terms and through their own forms.

The very existence of an MFA, and the key role it played in the revolutionary overthrow, and continues to play in the nation's political life, helped to politicize all levels of army life. In turn, the rank and file soldiers, sailors and marines had close ties with the people from which they came—most men are assigned to regiments in their own vicinity—and therefore could not help but become involved in all the issues of dispute.

Also, the Communist Party and some of the other Left groups had influence in the armed forces and encouraged meetings and assemblies of soldiers, and the formation of a rank and file soldiers revolutionary organization, Soldiers United Will Win.

Fearing this involvement in political life by the men in uniform, some army officers began to order their men to stay away from popular mass demonstrations or face the

charge of insubordination. However, these orders were violated en masse, and every attempt to impose penalties for such participation has failed. In a number of instances, where the armed forces were assigned to take over radio stations being run by the workers, they solidarized themselves with the workers and served as their protective shield.

Thus a form a mass counter power has been created, with the Azevedo government trying to maintain a precarious balance, although more in the direction of the Right than the Left.

How this stalemate will be broken is not clear. The Communist Party is pressing for a reconstitution of the government, with the PPD excluded. The PSP and PPD are pressing for a government that will exclude the Communists and be directed against them.

In an interview that Paul Cowan of the *Village Voice* held with Antonio Reis, a member of the 12-person Socialist Party directorate, and the vice-president of its parliamentary group in the Constituent Assembly, Reis told Cowan, "that during the weeks of negotiations that had preceded the government's establishment, the Socialist Party had made the need to be repressive one of its central bargaining points."

"It will be a subtle kind of repression," he says, "based largely on the party's capacity to mix persuasion with force." Reis' thesis is that "effective repression"—the clear establishment of authority—"can take place only in a climate of popular support."

But if Reis is looking for popular support for repression, he is going to look a long time. Repression may come, but it will not be popular, because it will be imposed against the people. Had Reis spoken of popular repression against the incendiaries and sabateurs, against those planning a military coup or civil war, he could get popular support. But that is not what he was talking about. This is made clear by Cowan. He says that

Reis is sure that the Socialist Party can create a favorable climate "by the time it has to order troops to break up strikes in factories or illegal land seizures in the South."

WE HAVE said that the present impasse cannot continue indefinitely. The inability of the government to act, is also a form of acting. The economic situation in the country is not improving. With the loss of the tourist trade and with fewer Portuguese holding jobs in other Western European countries and sending back money to their families, the balance of trade deficit is going to continue to get worse. With a shutdown of foreign capitalist credit, the ability of the country to purchase abroad will shrink greatly. Under those conditions, shortages will develop and prices tend to rise even more rapidly. Unemployment will also grow.

In addition, about 300,000 Portuguese Angolans have fled to Portugal. There *retornados* are largely hostile to the revolution, blame it for their plight, need jobs, and are a reserve force for reaction.

To meet this situation requires a strong government, not a weak or paralyzed one. If it is to be met in the interests of the revolution and the people, it requires the imposition of strict controls over imports, over foreign currency reserves, and over prices on goods of mass consumption. Those with money cannot be permitted to squander it abroad in the purchase of luxury items, no matter what they be. Foreign currency must be used only for the purchase of those necessities that will keep the economy going and meet the essential needs of the people. To stop people from freely buying foreign-made products may appear to some as undemocratic, and it is in an individualistic bourgeois sense, but it is highly democratic because it serves the best interests of the great majority.

A revolutionary government would also have to swiftly alter the pattern of Portuguese production and foreign trade. More items of necessity would be produced at

home, and foreign trade expanded to other than the four great imperialist powers who keep Portugal in a dependent position. This means increasing trade rapidly with the socialist countries, with the underdeveloped countries, and with other capitalist states.

Certain sacrifices would also be called for from the people, especially for those with higher earnings. Most working people will be ready to make such sacrifices if the purpose is to strengthen the revolution and the nation's course toward socialism. But they will be bitterly opposed if the purpose is to strengthen the wealthy classes.

When we visited the cooperative farm at Alpiaca and the cooperative metal plant in Oporto, the workers made clear to us that they were not thinking of using these properties to enrich themselves. They were going to use them for the benefit of the whole people.

Of course, not all workers think this way. Of course, economic difficulties may create even more division, and many, particularly from the middle class, may hold the revolution, and not the class of big capitalists, responsible for these. But such disaffections and waverings can be overcome if there is basic unity in the ranks of the great majority who want the revolution to continue marching forward.

AN OPPOSITE course may seem easier to some. It is the one dangled before the eyes of people by Mario Soares. It calls for a swerve to the Right, an end to nationalizations and agrarian reform, a return of many of the properties taken over by the people, and assurances to the western powers that Portugal is a bourgeois democracy and a safe place in which to make investments and to give credit. But how are these credits to be paid for and who is to do the paying? Are the rich ready to give up their profits, or some of their wealth, to pay for these? Hardly. The western powers know this. The guarantees they expect are assurances that the class struggle will be

put into clamps and that the rate of exploitation will be such as to assure them payment. And this means the destruction of the gains won and, in time, the imposition of a new fascist dictatorship.

The Portuguese Communist Party has declared that it is in favor of trying to get loans and credits abroad, but with no strings attached and without selling the country to foreign capital. Such loans and credits should be accepted only under conditions of strengthening the independence of Portugal and not its greater dependence.

THUS the problems of the Portuguese revolution are indeed complex and difficult of solution. But so have been those of every revolution. A ruling class never concedes power willingly, but desperately fights to hold on to it. And the people carrying through a revolution are always blazing a somewhat new and somewhat different path, for no two revolutions are identical. Hence mistakes are inevitable. But the greatest mistake of all is to fear making the revolution.

The key to what happens in Portugal in the struggles ahead will depend in large part on the ability to unite the ranks of those who favor a continuation of the revolution toward socialism, even if this unity is attained over the heads of some leaders. This holds in the first place for many of the followers of the Socialist Party. Only to the extent that these are won for a policy of Left unity and against unity with the Right, can the Socialist Party leadership be influenced in a different direction, or face complete discredit and isolation.

The Portuguese Communist Party is well aware of this need. It has repeatedly warned its members not to hold followers of the Socialist Party responsible for the misdeeds of Mario Soares. It has urged them to build a unity at the base which includes *all* working people.

In a major address delivered in Montemor-o-Novo, in the heart of the area of great agrarian reform, Alvaro Cunhal told the assembled mass that those who speak of

a "quarrel of parties" are incorrect. The quarrel is not between parties, but between those who want the revolutionary process to halt and those who want it to proceed.

What, he asked his audience rhetorically, are we going to do about a situation in which the Socialist Party unhappily maintains its anticommunist campaign instead of fighting reaction and the big capitalists and latifundists? "Are we going to make a counter holy war against the Socialists?"

No, we do not follow and will not follow such politics. Our principal enemies are the reactionaries, the big capitalists and big agrarians. It is against these enemies that we fight, and against them we are always ready to make fraternal union with those who are interested in doing so.

All workers suffer from exploitation and have the same interests, no matter what their ways of thinking or the political party they may support. Whether communists or socialists, no matter their political views, the workers are class brothers in the common fight for a better future, in the fight for agrarian reform, and for the liberation from capitalist exploitation.

A worker may not understand our Party's position, and may even criticize us and think us his enemy. But if this worker spends his day working in the fields, he is a class brother, is involved in a common struggle, which must attain unity to achieve its purpose.

There may be two small proprietors, a communist and a socialist, both have the same problems, both have the same difficulties, both have the same interests, both have the same enemies. They can and must make union in defense of their interests, in the fight against the common enemies, against the great capitalists, the great agrarians, against reaction. . . .

Despite the constant divisionist activities of certain parties, the Communist Party calls upon its militants to establish in their respective sectors the unity of action of democrats of all tendencies, either of the Left parties or the Socialist Party, or any other party. In our policy of unity and cooperation we

make no distinction and we do not impose any conditions but one—that the cooperation be based on concrete action for the construction of the new democratic Portugal, moving toward socialism.

One of the charges made against the Portuguese Communist Party by Mario Soares and other leaders of the Socialist Party is that it aims to impose one-party rule in Portugal through the means of an armed coup.

This is quite the opposite of the real position of the PCP.

At its 7th Party Congress held in October, 1974, five months after the fascist overthrow, the PCP defined both the present stage of the revolution and how it envisioned the revolution proceding to the second stage, that of socialism.

It saw the first stage as being "democratic and national" in character. Democratic, in that the revolution was putting an end to fascism, installing political liberty, ending the domination of the financial oligarchy, defending the interests of the people, and realizing a series of profound radical reforms in behalf of the nation and the great majority of people. It was "national," in that it was putting an end to imperialist domination over Portugal and Portugal's domination over colonial peoples.

If these objectives are achieved, said the Program of the 1974 Party Congress, a "peaceful passage to socialism" can be attained. The Program then went on to say:

> The working class and the toiling masses are interested in such a peaceful path and the Portuguese Communist Party will use all its influence to help make such a path possible. The April 25 victory and the consequent destruction of the fascist state increase the possibilities of attaining that goal.

Thus, the objectives of the Party are not an armed seizure of power, but a peaceful transition from one stage of the revolution to the next.

The 1974 program also discusses the kind of govern-

ment possible under Portuguese socialism. History has shown, it declared, that socialist rule assumes varied forms depending upon the concrete situation in each country. If the unity of multiple political organizations and groups can be maintained, then it should also be possible for a socialist government to function through a multi-party system in which there is an agreed upon program of common socialist action.

This is a "pluralism" quite different than that favored by the Socialist Party leadership, which sees "pluralism" as meaning unity with the Right, with the representatives of monopoly capitalism. Such is the "pluralism" of the German Social-Democratic Party, the British Labor Party leadership, and others. But the PCP does not believe in unity with the monopolists. Thus, the 1974 PCP Program stresses, "The PCP's policy of unity with other progressive forces is for today and for the future."

We are certain that if such unity is forged no power on earth can stop the revolution from achieving its objective of a democratic and socialist Portugal.

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